Relevant documentary just came out:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvAyykRvPBo
Relevant documentary just came out:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvAyykRvPBo
In reply to stroker :
Linky broken. 
Unrelated: What's the current status of the ZNPP?
There was much handwringing months ago that somebody would blow it up, turning it into a radiological weapon. And there was the potential for meltdown after the dam was blown, depriving it of an unlimited supply of cooling water.
Seemingly less concern now?
In reply to FJ40Jim :
DAMMIT! What is my problem lately? Try this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmMclP8dlI0
In reply to stroker :
Any particular parts of it you're wanting me to comment on? There's a lot to unpack there.
In reply to FJ40Jim :
Looks like 4 are in cold shutdown, 2 are in hot shutdown. So no electrical generation, the hot shutdown reactors are just running at low temp to create steam (I am guessing to heat the plant). That of course indicates all the reactors are still fueled. As noted in the article below, since the plant is not generating electricity, it is dependent on electricity to power the pumps etc, and the electrical lines into the plant have been greatly reduces and of course are always in some danger. I am sure they have gas powered generators on site, but of course you still need fuel for those.
02Pilot said:In reply to stroker :
Any particular parts of it you're wanting me to comment on? There's a lot to unpack there.
Well, the last 10 or 15 minutes is what I thought would benefit the most of us here...
In reply to stroker :
That's probably the part I'm most qualified to comment on; I know a little bit about air ops, but not to the extent that I could offer any additional insights.
I think the basic argument Bronk makes is fairly sound. There's nothing to really disagree with, though while he rightly points out the challenges facing Ukraine and the West, he doesn't do the same for Russia, making him a bit pessimistic on the overall situation. Not that he's that far off base, but I don't think Russia is in quite the strong position he suggests. Will it get there in 2025-6? Maybe, but there's a lot that can happen in that time.
As I've argued here before, in a purely Machiavellian sense, the best course of action is for the West to turn time against the Russians and drag out the war for as long as possible. If Ukraine is forced to turn to the defensive, at least on the ground, due to lack of munitions, so much the better (for the West, not Ukraine). Even though Russia can certainly keep going militarily whether their winning or losing (and losing here is not of existential consequence for the Russians in any case), I wonder about their ability to keep fighting inconclusively. Put another way, right now, they're having a fairly easy time of not losing. Winning will be much, much harder, at least in if it's decided in military terms. But how long will Russia keep grinding away at a Ukrainian hedgehog defense before they decide it's not worth it? Five years? Ten? Meanwhile, if Ukraine shifts to an air/sea approach against logistics targets and base areas, combined with partisan warfare in occupied areas, they can work on exhausting the Russians at much lower cost than conventional offensive operations.
02Pilot said:In reply to stroker :
Meanwhile, if Ukraine shifts to an air/sea approach against logistics targets and base areas, combined with partisan warfare in occupied areas, they can work on exhausting the Russians at much lower cost than conventional offensive operations.
Which gets back to my question about how Ukraine fights an asymmetrical war from a few pages ago. Seems to me that Ukraine could make itself a "tar baby" in some fairly inexpensive ways if they're creative. While the Russians willingness to lose 300K casualties (so far) is daunting, I have to wonder how much longer their population will tolerate this. Second, if Western tech (notably Air and Air Defence) starts establishing Supremacy then I have to believe that's going to seriously undercut potential Russian arms sales.
The last few minutes I think make a very useful point about the concept of "just negotiate to end" that is being pushed. As noted in the video and noted here before, if the Russian aren't in a position of pain, why would then even bother to start negotiating (except is a very slanted way of course).
The points about the F-16's runway needs are something I did not consider fully either. As noted previously, Ukraine having F16's is unlikely to be revolutionary because of the battle zone situation (heavy air defense) but the US fighters requirement for rather large pristine landing surfaces (unlike typical Russian aircraft) makes having generally untouched airports important, and that could certainly be difficult, especially in any more forward refueling bases.
I am a little confused about the talk of effective air to air uses of the F16, since I am not sure that is much of a concern with all the air defense and I don't think they will get long enough range missiles to do cross boarder sniping of planes.
Right, for this to end, Russia has to want to get out. If they think they can win at an acceptable cost, they have no incentive to stop. So you have to raise the costs by blood, treasure, and/or time, but that's only half the equation. Casualties, munitions expenditure, reduced foreign military sales, and the economic drag of remaining on a war footing for a prolonged period all work to do that, but Russia has borne high costs and won before. If you look at the wars they've lost - Afghanistan, most recently - it was the combination of losses and financial burdens with other global factors one the one hand, but also the increasing realization that the potential benefits of victory were shrinking as the costs were rising.
In Ukraine, conventional forces seem unlikely at this stage to be capable of applying the necessary pressures over time; the intensity of combat to this point is not sustainable without major Western commitments that are not forthcoming. A shift to an unconventional approach on the ground, in concert with a sporadic but sustained series of strikes on operational and strategic targets, could shift the balance, but it will take a lot of time. Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated their impatience, sometimes to their detriment, and it will be difficult for them to pivot. Training the necessary forces to carry out such a campaign effectively and with minimal losses would probably take ~18-24 months of high intensity workup. In the meantime, they would have to be content to hold the line; again, Zelensky does not seem willing to do this.
As to the F-16s, the video does a good job of laying out the problems that will limit their effectiveness. Quite frankly, Ukraine needs Apaches more than Vipers, but they aren't going to get them. The aircraft they get as donations will be airframes nearing the end of their service life; they are not going to be gifted brand new Gripens or anything else.
I still contend that the way to effectively end this is to come up with a plan that neutralizes (i.e., no NATO, and probably no bilateral defense treaties with NATO members) Ukraine while providing it a robust defensive capability and allows it to orient its economy toward the West. This reduces the potential value of continued fighting to Russia. Combined with a hard-to-defeat asymmetrical approach as described above, it starts to set the stage for drawing the war to a close. Critics will complain that aggression is being rewarded - perhaps it is, but one has to ask which of the achievable outcomes are their highest priorities.
While I don't necessarily agree with the author's conclusions, this Foreign Affairs article does a good, if brief, job of describing Russia's approach to conflict.
02Pilot said:Right, for this to end, Russia has to want to get out. [...] If you look at the wars they've lost - Afghanistan, most recently - it was the combination of losses and financial burdens with other global factors one the one hand, but also the increasing realization that the potential benefits of victory were shrinking as the costs were rising.
I had to look it up, but the Soviets were in Afghanistan for 10 years. Occupations are difficult...especially if your opponents are funded/supplied by the west.
The invasion seems to be almost entirely the brainchild of Putin. At some point in the next 20 years he'll be gone...will whoever succeeds Putin really want to continue the conflict?
=========================================================
Explosion at a tank engine factory. If I understand the logic, preventing war material from reaching the front lines is one of the most efficient methods of disrupting the supply chains (which are called lines of communication i think?).
A general update: The basic situation in Ukraine is that there are no big movements and the weather has turned. It has been rainy there for a while now. As you can imagine, trenches and rain do no go well together. There is a rather large storm in the Black Sea currently. Snow has appeared in parts of Ukraine (e.g. temps in Kyiv this week is in the 30's f ). The weather will certainly slow things down a bit, but maybe not as much as might be expected. The Russians will certainly be more restricted in their large vehicle attacks (and very large losses as the result). The, what is now, a mostly infantry / artillery based war will likely continue at it's current, rather slow, pace.
Widespread blackouts in occupied Crimea as result of storm
The Russians have launched large drone attacks recently and will likely target power infrastructure again in another attempt to freeze out the Ukrainians. I would suspect Ukraine has tried to reduce their vulnerabilities as much as possible. The Russians have also started to create more stealthy Shahed drones, which seems to involve wrapping them in carbon fiber:
The first M1 Abrams appear to be making their way to the fighting. As may be obvious by now, M1's will likely not have any big effect. They are certainly way more capable then most Russian tanks, but tank battles are rather uncommon with all the drones. Night operations will likely be enhanced though. Defense against AT missiles and drones are of course a large concern, while mines are a major issue also, none of which the M1 is likely to have a big increased resistance from (as can be seen by the Leopard II losses noted previously).
I am not sure why I am posting TOTALLY RANDOM things that are happening in Ukraine. Clearly someone is not paying attention so that they are not eating metal objects!!
I mean, how else could this have otherwise happened!?!? 
Ukraine spy chief's wife poisoned, says Kyiv
The wife of Ukraine's spy chief Lt Gen Kyrylo Budanov, Marianna Budanova, has been poisoned with heavy metals, a spokesman for the country's military intelligence has told BBC Ukrainian.
Andriy Yusov said several other agency employees also had mild symptoms of poisoning. He did not specify how many.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67552036
My guess is, certain Russian officials, might want to have their assistants give that Christmas fruit cake a taste before they scarf it down! I mean, I am sure the Ukrainians can play this game also and Ukraine has been shown to be very creative with such things....
In reply to aircooled :
arsenic is a metal....
Some stuff:
- Ukraine is apparently having some issue with the fuel consumption and need for maintenance (specifically clogged air filters, they do draw in a LOT of air) with the M1's. None of this of course should be a surprise at all.
- Russia is reportedly (by British Intelligence) taking 900 casualties a day trying to take Avdivka. (!)
The German concern Rheinmetall plans to begin production of armored vehicles in Ukraine as early as 2024.
We are talking about the Fuchs wheeled armored personnel carrier, which they want to begin producing 6-7 months after signing the contract, and the modern Lynx infantry fighting vehicle, which will be ready about a year after that.
Rheinmetall does not plan to build new plants in Ukraine; the plan is to lease existing ones, which “seem to be fairly well protected” based on the war experience.
-----
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 1 decree is likely a formal recognition of the Russian military’s current end strength and not an order to immediately increase the number of Russian military personnel. Putin signed a decree on December 1 increasing the official end strength of the Russian military from 2.039 million personnel to 2.209 million personnel and total Russian combat personnel from 1.15 million to 1.32 million... .....Putin’s December 1, 2023 decree is thus likely establishing 2.209 million personnel as the new official end strength rather than ordering a significant new increase in the total size of the Russian military.
Ukrainian air defense coverage along the front line is reportedly incentivizing Russian forces to rely more heavily on remote strikes with glide bombs. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on December 3 that Ukrainian forces shoot down Russian attack helicopters, such as Ka-52 and Mi-24 helicopters, as soon as they enter the range of Ukrainian air defense systems.[7] Shtupun stated that this Ukrainian air defense capability has prompted Russian forces to use Su-35 and Su-34 attack aircraft to launch remote strikes with glide bombs from 50 to 70 kilometers behind the line of combat engagement.[8] Russian forces effectively used helicopters to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast in summer 2023 but decreased the use of rotary wing aircraft following the downing of Ka-52 helicopters in the area in mid-August 2023.[9] Shtupun’s statements are consistent with these observations as well as with the increased Russian use of glide bombs throughout the frontline, particularly in southern Ukraine.[10]
Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on December 3 that Ukrainian air defenses are similarly prompting Russian forces to increase their use of KAB glide bombs because FAB glide bombs require Russian aircraft to fly within range of Ukrainian air defenses.[11] Ihnat added that KAB bombs are inaccurate and that Russian forces therefore launch a large number of the glide bombs to strike Ukrainian targets.[12] Ihnat stated that Russian aviation launches about 100 glide bombs on average at Ukrainian targets along the front line each day and stated that Ukraine needs long-range air defense systems and F-16 fighter jets to counter the current Russian aviation threat.[13]
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian air defense systems are also constraining Ukrainian operations along the front, specifically Russian SA-15 TOR short-range surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs).[14] The UK MoD reported that Russian forces use the SA-15 SAMs to provide cover for Russian ground forces at the front line and have effectively employed them to counter Ukrainian drone operations.[15]
The Russian government is likely continuing attempts to censor relatives of mobilized Russian military personnel on social media out of concern about their protests’ possible negative effect on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s still unannounced 2024 presidential campaign
What are your children worth?
Russia Increases Military Salaries Tenfold to Address ‘Depleted’ Force
The Russian military is reportedly offering salaries up to 10 times higher than the country’s average to entice civilians to join its ground forces in Ukraine.
The information was disclosed by a non-profit organization called Ukrainian Victims of War (UVW), in collaboration with the Ukrainian Catholic University.
According to the report, potential recruits are being offered a monthly income of up to 700,000 rubles ($8,961), more than 10 times the average wage of 63,060 rubles ($807).....
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2023/05/15/russia-military-salaries-tenfold/
And yes, that is an average annual income of $10,000.
In reply to aircooled :
Perhaps the goal is to have the new recruits die in wave attacks before too many paychecks. $107.5k/yr seems like very good pay, regardless of being in Russia or not.
This is a few days ago but deserves mention. Ukraine blew up the 2 railways connecting Russia to Siberia/China/north Korea/Pacific coast. Appears to be well planned & well executed.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russian-soldiers-charged-war-crimes-torture-ukraine/
Not sure if it's related to these two or someone else:
My guess is no, based on this comment: "Charging documents said the unnamed victim had been living in Ukraine since 2021 and had not fought or participated in the war."
In reply to FJ40Jim :
One in a long tunnel, the other on a bridge. It may be a long time before those routes are open again.
This goal seems HIGHLY unlikely at this point. The Russians have been making very slow progress towards encirclement, at very high costs, but another week? Very, very unlikely. Will Ukraine hold in the long run? Hard to say, but it also seems unlikely Russia will be able to push at their current rate.
The Russian military was ordered to take Avdiivka before Putin’s press conference, which will take place on December 14, — Russian media
Relatives of mobilized soldiers complain that they are being thrown into "meat assaults"
Comparison from Oct 1st to now (this likely represents 20,000+ Russian casualties):
Now:
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