To put this in motorsports terms, we're about four minutes into free practice session #1 - it's too early to talk about what qualifying is going to look like, let alone who's going to win the race. It doesn't stop people from speculating, but it's all pretty meaningless at this stage - too many unknowns, too many variables.
As O2 is noting, it's very preliminary to come to any realistic conclusions. I, personally, don't mind any guessing about what people think might happen, it's not a good idea politically / practically, but for discussion sake I find it very interesting to compare people guesses in the moment to the future reality (an interesting active history kind of thing).
The US and Russia will start a separate set of talks apparently focused more directly on only specific US / Russian topics.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on February 22 that US and Russian officials are planning to meet within the next two weeks in an unspecified third country about bilateral relations. Ryabkov claimed that the United States and Russia are undertaking two "parallel" but "politically interconnected" negotiation tracks that will discuss the war in Ukraine and US-Russian bilateral relations.[1] Ryabkov added that Russia is prioritizing its demand for the United States to return six Russian diplomatic properties, likely referring to properties US authorities previously seized on charges of being used for intelligence purposes.[2] Ryabkov also stated that the United States and Russian delegations may discuss other international topics such as arms control and the situation in the Middle East.[3] US and Russian officials met in Saudi Arabia for bilateral talks about the war in Ukraine on February 18.[4]
ISW has an interesting observation on the to potential cessation of hostilities and the dangers the returning veterans might be to Putin's regime. It is looking like the Russians are in a loose / loose situation in a number of ways:
These are just highlights, if you want to read the whole thing, it's a bit long: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/putin-unlikely-demobilize-event-ceasefire-because-he-afraid-his-veterans::
The Kremlin is intensifying a campaign launched in late 2022 and early 2023 to prevent the emergence of an independent veterans-based civil society and an influx of alienated veterans in Russia likely because it perceives the demobilization of Russian veterans as a potential threat to regime stability.
The Kremlin likely fears that it will face even worse political instability than what the Soviet Union experienced after its withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988-1989 because of Russia’s failure to militarize and mobilize Russian society for a protracted war.
The Kremlin is likely particularly concerned that veterans’ return could trigger a new wave of "Afghan syndrome" and the rise of new veterans groups critical of the Russian war effort or military
The Kremlin likely observed warning signs of the emergence of new political cleavages among Russian veterans after declaring partial mobilization in September 2022
The Kremlin faced the threat of an emerging veterans opposition movement against the Putin regime between late 2022 and mid-2023 when patrons tried to weaponize Russian servicemen and veterans to advance personal political objectives
The Kremlin launched various immediate force centralization, censorship, and repression efforts in late 2022 through mid-2023 to eliminate the immediate threat of an emerging anti-Putin veterans civil society.
The Kremlin launched the Defenders of the Fatherland State Fund in April 2023 as a long-term initiative intended to coopt veterans by monopolizing all veterans support initiatives and funds
The Kremlin established the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration in February 2024 to form a new Russian elite composed of a limited number of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize the Russian society over the long term
.....
The Kremlin has seemingly been successful in alleviating the immediate threat of the alienated veterans' civil society in mid-2023 and has been relatively successful in ensuring that the Putin regime does not face a similar political threat in the short term.
The Kremlin's veterans’ life and civil society initiatives are unlikely to meaningfully prepare Russia for mass reintegration of veterans into society and prevent the "Afghan syndrome" in the long run, however.
These initiatives likely lack the resources to accommodate tens or hundreds of thousands of returning Russian veterans and fulfill the Kremlin's enlistment promises
----
Conclusion:
The Kremlin's focus on co-opting and establishing a state-controlled veterans civil society indicates that the Kremlin assesses that societal effects from Russia’s war in Ukraine can pose significant risks to Putin’s regime’s stability. The Kremlin therefore remains unlikely to demobilize unless it secures full political or military victory against Ukraine and after having taken measures to insulate Russian society from the destabilizing effects inherent in returning hundreds of thousands of veterans brutalized by the horrible conditions on the front lines back to civilian life. Putin's regime’s stability relies on the social contract that he had made with the Russian people to avoid the socioeconomic turmoil Russia experienced following the fall of the Soviet Union, and this consideration will likely continue to dictate his policies and calculus in the long-term. Putin likely perceives anything short of total political or military victory in Ukraine as risking mobilizing Russian veterans against the Kremlin.
A near-constant state of military mobilization is therefore one of the least politically risky configurations for Putin. This dynamic will likely prompt Putin to maintain high levels of military readiness to simultaneously set conditions that would allow him to sustain protracted or future war against Ukraine and / or prepare for a confrontation with NATO, while minimizing the threat that Russian veterans may undermine his regime. US policymakers must take these Russian incentives into account when assessing Russia’s negotiating position, and when evaluating what propositions the Kremlin is likely to reject.
In reply to aircooled :
So you're saying Putin's only hope is for non of his soldiers to come home alive and tell their story?
In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :
Good to know that all Ukraine needs to do to maybe retain some level of US support is to definitely give away generations of future economic potential. The weak kid being shaken down for lunch money basically
Well, since a good chunk of those resources are in now Russian controlled territory, "all" Ukraine needs to do is force the Russians back across the border and secure it. It's not just about allowing the U.S. access to the resources. It's about having U.S. interests within Ukraine. The U.S. has a history of protecting it's interests abroad, NATO or not. See the Middle East. Ukraine gets a benefit arguably better than being a NATO member.
The way I see it playing out- the current administration is eager to end the war. They are trying to come up with a solution that is acceptable by all parties to end the fighting. They don't have any say directly on stopping the fighting. That is up to Russia and to a smaller extent Ukraine (they obviously can't just stop defending themselves, but they can give up concessions to get Russia to stop.) But since how much we supply directly affects both how well Ukraine can defend themselves and attack Russia, that lever does have a big influence on stopping the fighting. They have made it clear that they have no interest in maintaining a stalemate. They are working on a compromise that they feel is reasonable for both sides. That doesn't mean equal- Ukraine is kicking Russia's ass, and Russia's strategy of throwing more men into the meat grinder won't work forever. I'm not informed enough to know what that would look like, but since many of the resources sought by the US are in Russian controlled territory, I expect much of that to be returned at least. Ukraine doesn't join NATO. They don't really need to for reasons mentions above, but it allows Putin to save some face and "get something" out of the war. Whatever the proposal, there is a pretty effective carrot and stick to encourage both sides to agree to end the war. If Ukraine rejects what the U.S. feels is a fair proposal, then support is cut and they can rely on Europe. If Russia rejects it, the U.S. gives Ukraine pretty much whatever they need to drive the Russians out, and they won't likely be stopping at Crimea.
As far as what the public is hearing, I back up the "count to 10" statements above. We aren't hearing everything, just what they want the other side to hear. That's part of negotiation. We also have a habit of making heros out of victims. While no doubt Ukraine is the victim and their stand against Russia has been extremely heroic, they should not be without reproach. At best, until very recently, they had a horribly corrupt government. The current U.S. administration believes that our own government is riddled with corruption and fraud, making it a top priority to address the perceived fraud and waste. So it shouldn't be surprising that they are highly suspicious of the Ukrainian government. To not be they would see as being incredibly naive.
Boost_Crazy said:In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :
Good to know that all Ukraine needs to do to maybe retain some level of US support is to definitely give away generations of future economic potential. The weak kid being shaken down for lunch money basically
Well, since a good chunk of those resources are in now Russian controlled territory, "all" Ukraine needs to do is force the Russians back across the border and secure it. It's not just about allowing the U.S. access to the resources. It's about having U.S. interests within Ukraine. The U.S. has a history of protecting it's interests abroad, NATO or not. See the Middle East. Ukraine gets a benefit arguably better than being a NATO member.
The way I see it playing out- the current administration is eager to end the war. They are trying to come up with a solution that is acceptable by all parties to end the fighting. They don't have any say directly on stopping the fighting. That is up to Russia and to a smaller extent Ukraine (they obviously can't just stop defending themselves, but they can give up concessions to get Russia to stop.) But since how much we supply directly affects both how well Ukraine can defend themselves and attack Russia, that lever does have a big influence on stopping the fighting. They have made it clear that they have no interest in maintaining a stalemate. They are working on a compromise that they feel is reasonable for both sides. That doesn't mean equal- Ukraine is kicking Russia's ass, and Russia's strategy of throwing more men into the meat grinder won't work forever. I'm not informed enough to know what that would look like, but since many of the resources sought by the US are in Russian controlled territory, I expect much of that to be returned at least. Ukraine doesn't join NATO. They don't really need to for reasons mentions above, but it allows Putin to save some face and "get something" out of the war. Whatever the proposal, there is a pretty effective carrot and stick to encourage both sides to agree to end the war. If Ukraine rejects what the U.S. feels is a fair proposal, then support is cut and they can rely on Europe. If Russia rejects it, the U.S. gives Ukraine pretty much whatever they need to drive the Russians out, and they won't likely be stopping at Crimea.
As far as what the public is hearing, I back up the "count to 10" statements above. We aren't hearing everything, just what they want the other side to hear. That's part of negotiation. We also have a habit of making heros out of victims. While no doubt Ukraine is the victim and their stand against Russia has been extremely heroic, they should not be without reproach. At best, until very recently, they had a horribly corrupt government. The current U.S. administration believes that our own government is riddled with corruption and fraud, making it a top priority to address the perceived fraud and waste. So it shouldn't be surprising that they are highly suspicious of the Ukrainian government. To not be would they would see as being incredibly naive.
Ukraine was invaded by a larger and more powerful neighbor and now their precarious position is being used by the US to extract benefits. None of this has any bearing whatsoever on whether or not Ukraine used to have a corrupt government and may still have pockets of corruption remaining, and no relation to what Musk is doing back home. Either continue to support them or not but do not use them.
I am going to back off from this thread. It is becoming impossible to keep domestic politics out of it because the US is now squarely involved and appears to to me to have taken the wrong side. I would ask you to be impartial and not to become apologists.
In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :
Ukraine was invaded by a larger and more powerful neighbor and now their precarious position is being used by the US to extract benefits. None of this has any bearing whatsoever on whether or not Ukraine used to have a corrupt government and may still have pockets of corruption remaining, and no relation to what Musk is doing back home. Either continue to support them or not but do not use them.
Yes, it is very unfortunate that they were invaded by a larger and more powerful nation. The fact is, despite the tremendous job that they are doing, they are unable to repel the invaders without outside help. They are not a part of an official alliance. They need to rely on the charity of other nations or compensate other nations for the resources that they need. Or rely on the fact that they are fighting the foe of other nations, weakening them and field testing weapons and tactics for sympathetic nations. I'd argue that is also of tremendous value, but can also be seen as using them- they are dying testing our weapons so that we don't have too. Point is, most everything is a trade off. In an ideal world, we'd have a Desert Storm style coalition drive the bully out of the innocent country. But this bully has nukes, which you yourself have expressed concerns about. For Ukraine to "win," Putin needs to understand that further conflict is futile, without backing him into a nuclear corner. Much easier said than done. We can keep up the status quo, which would appear to keep the stalemate going. Strategically for the West, this would continue to grind down Russia, a huge win- but at the expense of Ukraine. Expanded support could turn the tide for Ukraine, but push Putin into a corner. A "fair" peace deal could change that. It puts the initiative on Putin. If he rejects it and suffers as a result, it would be much harder for him to claim that he was pushed into a corner. Who knows, support may drop enough for him that he would have to worry about falling out of a window. But more importantly, if he believes that there is a chance that the U.S. is prepared to throw full support behind Ukraine, he understands that he would be in a situation that he desperately wants to avoid- and choose peace instead.
And yes, the fact that the current administration is focused on waste and corruption at home most certainly translates to scrutinizing waste and corruption abroad. It would be hard to justify what some call extreme measures at home to just ignore it when sending tax money overseas.
I am going to back off from this thread. It is becoming impossible to keep domestic politics out of it because the US is now squarely involved and appears to to me to have taken the wrong side. I would ask you to be impartial and not to become apologists.It's not impossible to keep the two separate, it's just important to remember the the U.S., like every other country, has it's own interests to balance.
I'd urge you to focus more on actions rather than the words exchanged publicly in the process of negotiation. If you think the U.S. has taken the wrong side, I think that you may be grossly misinterpreting what you are hearing. Love or hate the policies of the current administration and their previous term, I've found that they have been highly effective in accomplishing what they have said that they are going to do. They often make extreme statements in the process, but end up back where they promised. A great example was when they threatened to leave NATO. Problem- much of NATO was not contributing as promised. They threaten to leave NATO, and the world freaks out. Result- they did not leave NATO, and participation by others has increased dramatically.
In reply to Boost_Crazy :
In my opinion, Putin was the person most responsible for the increased NATO contributions.
Boost_Crazy said:In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :
Ukraine was invaded by a larger and more powerful neighbor and now their precarious position is being used by the US to extract benefits. None of this has any bearing whatsoever on whether or not Ukraine used to have a corrupt government and may still have pockets of corruption remaining, and no relation to what Musk is doing back home. Either continue to support them or not but do not use them.
Yes, it is very unfortunate that they were invaded by a larger and more powerful nation. The fact is, despite the tremendous job that they are doing, they are unable to repel the invaders without outside help. They are not a part of an official alliance. They need to rely on the charity of other nations or compensate other nations for the resources that they need. Or rely on the fact that they are fighting the foe of other nations, weakening them and field testing weapons and tactics for sympathetic nations. I'd argue that is also of tremendous value, but can also be seen as using them- they are dying testing our weapons so that we don't have too. Point is, most everything is a trade off. In an ideal world, we'd have a Desert Storm style coalition drive the bully out of the innocent country. But this bully has nukes, which you yourself have expressed concerns about. For Ukraine to "win," Putin needs to understand that further conflict is futile, without backing him into a nuclear corner. Much easier said than done. We can keep up the status quo, which would appear to keep the stalemate going. Strategically for the West, this would continue to grind down Russia, a huge win- but at the expense of Ukraine. Expanded support could turn the tide for Ukraine, but push Putin into a corner. A "fair" peace deal could change that. It puts the initiative on Putin. If he rejects it and suffers as a result, it would be much harder for him to claim that he was pushed into a corner. Who knows, support may drop enough for him that he would have to worry about falling out of a window. But more importantly, if he believes that there is a chance that the U.S. is prepared to throw full support behind Ukraine, he understands that he would be in a situation that he desperately wants to avoid- and choose peace instead.
And yes, the fact that the current administration is focused on waste and corruption at home most certainly translates to scrutinizing waste and corruption abroad. It would be hard to justify what some call extreme measures at home to just ignore it when sending tax money overseas.
I am going to back off from this thread. It is becoming impossible to keep domestic politics out of it because the US is now squarely involved and appears to to me to have taken the wrong side. I would ask you to be impartial and not to become apologists.
It's not impossible to keep the two separate, it's just important to remember the the U.S., like every other country, has it's own interests to balance.
I'd urge you to focus more on actions rather than the words exchanged publicly in the process of negotiation. If you think the U.S. has taken the wrong side, I think that you may be grossly misinterpreting what you are hearing. Love or hate the policies of the current administration and their previous term, I've found that they have been highly effective in accomplishing what they have said that they are going to do. They often make extreme statements in the process, but end up back where they promised. A great example was when they threatened to leave NATO. Problem- much of NATO was not contributing as promised. They threaten to leave NATO, and the world freaks out. Result- they did not leave NATO, and participation by others has increased dramatically.
I'm going to make a semantic argument here that touches on several points above (from both people quoted).
There are two types of words used to describe situations and policies in international relations. The first sort are words that describe things in moral terms: "Right" and "wrong", of course, but also weighted terms, like in this case "use" and "extract". The second sort are words that describe things in dispassionate terms, such as "interest", "resource", and "effective".
The second sort of words are the language generally used behind closed doors, out of the public eye. When exposed to it, particularly in countries where a sense of moral rectitude prevails, people tend to recoil in horror, but any seasoned diplomat worth his salt would not even flinch. Like it or not, national policy is most often driven by that cold, calculating language, and when it isn't, outcomes don't tend to be very good.
Having sympathy for Ukraine and its people is not in question here, nor is recognition of Russia as the aggressor. But agreeing on those points, any government in the world is going to confront the same questions: 1) Does this affect us? 2) Can we act to influence the outcome? 3) If so, should we influence the outcome? 4) What do we hope to gain by influencing the outcome? 5) What risks do we incur by attempting to influence the outcome? 6) Do those risks outweigh the potential gains? 7) What is our policy, how long will it take to work, and how much will it cost?
For the US right now, the answers to the first three questions is affirmative. Question four is rather key here: the prior administration never clearly articulated what it hoped to gain, whereas the current one is beginning to do so (I suspect the specifics are still in flux and being argued behind the curtain). The answer to question five is fairly clear. Question six can now at least begin to be addressed; under the previous administration, without a clear objective established, it was impossible to complete the equation, whereas the current one is starting to work out the math. The final question is also coming into focus - the prior administration maintained operational goals (help Ukraine defend itself, support the existing government there, weaken Russia), the current one is developing strategic ones (establish a cease-fire, cut US costs, create conditions for focus on global strategic priorities).
This is not stated as an endorsement of the current US administration's policy. It is, however, important to acknowledge that in the end, every state's policy must, first and foremost, reflect its own strategic priorities as the leadership understands them. Until recently, the US and much of Europe were allowing Ukraine's strategic priorities to take precedence over their own. If the shifts of the last month have caused the discussion to move toward Western recognition that countries must look out for themselves before anyone else, I do not think it is a bad thing; the Russians and the Chinese understand it clearly, just as clearly as do the Ukrainians.
In reply to Floating Doc (Forum Supporter) :
In reply to Boost_Crazy :
In my opinion, Putin was the person most responsible for the increased NATO contributions.
You are not wrong, there was a huge spike in the number of members meeting the 2% of GDP obligation in 2023. But there wasn't a blip after Georgia in 2008 or Crimea in 2014. There was a significant upward swing that started in 2018 after the U.S. threatened to leave NATO.
In reply to 02Pilot :
Thank you for explaining that so clearly. I think what surprises people is that the current administration often says some of the behind closed door parts in public. I believe it's a negotiating tool- all the players know that there are different public and private discussions like you described. When one says the private part public, it may be more effective. It's not the way things are usually done, they must really mean it. It's also a way of telling your opponent that you aren't bluffing, you hold all the cards and aren't afraid to show them. It's an interesting strategy, I hope It's effective.
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