History in the Making: Russian Invasion

Speaking for myself, I appreciate the dispassionate analysis that O2 brings to this thread. You can argue all day about what's right and wrong, and I suspect most of us are in agreement with regards to this war. Russia is the aggressor, period. Still, that doesn't change the facts on the ground. Ukraine has done an admirable job of resisting, with support from the West. Morally, Ukraine's goal should be to push Russia back to the 2014 borders, but that's probably not realistic without a major increase in support from the West, which isn't likely to happen. So, we're left with a negotiated peace of some kind. Sooner or later, Ukraine will have to accept that they have permanently lost some territory. It's not right, but it is reality. Where those lines are drawn is the crux at this point.

In reply to TRoglodyte :

If you can explain how ~200k Americans were going to defeat ~2.5 million Chinese (and that's just the standing army) while giving up the terrain advantages afforded by the narrow frontage of the Korean Peninsula, I'm all ears. FWIW, if you want to address the atomic option, the US atomic bomb stockpile was under 300 in 1950, and the B-29 was the only delivery system; given that the MiG-15 had proven quite effective, and that they would be operating from bases much closer to the front than US fighter aircraft, along with extensive anti-aircraft defenses deployed in-depth, penetration into that airspace would be difficult at best. Oh, and the Soviets had recently (1949) successfully tested their own atomic bomb.

MacArthur had several positive qualities; geopolitical awareness and understand the primacy of grand strategy in national policy were not among them.

Wow, there's a lot to filter through in the last couple days. 

The one thing that baffles me is the escalation in aggressiveness seen in recent posts challenging the analysis provided.

I agree with Tom, that the analysis provided is something I appreciate. The analysis looks at the events with a level of knowledge and understanding I don't possess, and is made through a lens that is much different than the MSM. I like that it doesn't get caught up in the emotional/moral debate around the motives and actions of the various players. 

The historical "what ifs" being brought into the discussion are pure opinion and there is not way of knowing how they would have reshaped the world. They may be an interesting thought exercise, but probably better suited to a separate thread. 
 

02Pilot said:

In reply to Xceler8x :

I've addressed all of these points before. All parties will take firm positions at the beginning of negotiations; the issue at hand is the disconnect between each position and how realistic it is, given the existing state of the game. The US has great flexibility here, so it can essentially assume any position it wishes. Russia is grasping for more than it has, but as recent statements have suggested, they may be willing to accept the status quo, and there for have a fair bit of flexibility, as they are tactically ascendant at the moment and in a position to hold what they have gained. Ukraine, on the other hand, has very little flexibility, due to their dependence on foreign aid, and thus their position is furthest from achievable reality.

"Unlawful" is a meaningless phrase in international relations, as there is no functional international law that contains an enforcement mechanism. The Budapest Memorandum is not a legally binding document in any sense (had it been a treaty, ratified by the US Senate and the other signing parties, this would be different), and it contains no specific language regarding obligations or protections.

Ukraine will ultimately make concessions because it has no other choice, or they will be compelled to sign an instrument of surrender. Rather than being forced into a corner, I'm suggesting it should attempt to use what leverage it has now to shape the settlement to whatever advantage it can manage. Being obstinate will not allow them to do this, as Zelensky seems to be slowly, belatedly realizing.

To your comment to Opti, the accumulated cost of supporting Ukraine over time has clearly tipped the cost:benefit scales for some, just as it did in Korea and Vietnam, and virtually every post-colonial conflict, and many others. Calculations of support do not remain static.

The bitter pill here, at least for me, is your implication that some parties have no choice but to accept whatever is forced upon them by anyone with the power and will to do so.

Although it may be meant as impartial analysis, is can come off as a de facto acceptance of injustice at the hands of any nation who can get away with it. The scorpion stings; the powerful loot and plunder. A bully stole my lunch today. So what? That's what bullies do.

You may have been marinating in this logic for years, but not all of us have. When we see our elected (!) leaders echoing, nearly verbatim, the verbiage used by the country that was until very recently the enemy we were all taught to fear and, most importantly, never to trust, in order to "bring peace" to a nation that said enemy wantonly invaded and is continuing to indiscriminately attack, it raises eyebrows. Hearing you say, "well, that's just the way it is; every man for himself" sounds close enough to endorsement to the fact - and I believe it is a fact - that our administration is now working for russian leadership, that it's difficult to remember that your goal is to remain objective.

And, worse than that, it doesn't inspire confidence in either our individual leaders or our system at large.

In reply to 02Pilot :

I am going to back O2 on this one big time. (Regarding TRoglodyte's statement on Korea) I think the best thing I could say about such a statement is: "It benefits greatly from never having to be tested".

In other words, it might sound good as a sound bite (simple answer to a very complex problem), but the realities of it are enormous, and almost entirely bad.

And just a small additional note on that:  We did fight the Chinese there... and they kicked our butt all the way back to the 48th parallel and created the prime motivation for the armistice!

Korea would probably be like Vietnam is now if we had just let things play out instead of propping up the side that collaborated with the Japanese and bombing every structure larger than an outhouse.

02Pilot said:

In reply to TRoglodyte :

If you can explain how ~200k Americans were going to defeat ~2.5 million Chinese (and that's just the standing army) while giving up the terrain advantages afforded by the narrow frontage of the Korean Peninsula, I'm all ears. FWIW, if you want to address the atomic option, the US atomic bomb stockpile was under 300 in 1950, and the B-29 was the only delivery system; given that the MiG-15 had proven quite effective, and that they would be operating from bases much closer to the front than US fighter aircraft, along with extensive anti-aircraft defenses deployed in-depth, penetration into that airspace would be difficult at best. Oh, and the Soviets had recently (1949) successfully tested their own atomic bomb.

MacArthur had several positive qualities; geopolitical awareness and understand the primacy of grand strategy in national policy were not among them.

All of that, plus the fact that the American people's willingness to enter into another world war (this time with nukes) so soon after the last one was pretty low. Truman had no choice but to rein MacArthur in.

DarkMonohue said:

02Pilot said:

In reply to Xceler8x :

I've addressed all of these points before. All parties will take firm positions at the beginning of negotiations; the issue at hand is the disconnect between each position and how realistic it is, given the existing state of the game. The US has great flexibility here, so it can essentially assume any position it wishes. Russia is grasping for more than it has, but as recent statements have suggested, they may be willing to accept the status quo, and there for have a fair bit of flexibility, as they are tactically ascendant at the moment and in a position to hold what they have gained. Ukraine, on the other hand, has very little flexibility, due to their dependence on foreign aid, and thus their position is furthest from achievable reality.

"Unlawful" is a meaningless phrase in international relations, as there is no functional international law that contains an enforcement mechanism. The Budapest Memorandum is not a legally binding document in any sense (had it been a treaty, ratified by the US Senate and the other signing parties, this would be different), and it contains no specific language regarding obligations or protections.

Ukraine will ultimately make concessions because it has no other choice, or they will be compelled to sign an instrument of surrender. Rather than being forced into a corner, I'm suggesting it should attempt to use what leverage it has now to shape the settlement to whatever advantage it can manage. Being obstinate will not allow them to do this, as Zelensky seems to be slowly, belatedly realizing.

To your comment to Opti, the accumulated cost of supporting Ukraine over time has clearly tipped the cost:benefit scales for some, just as it did in Korea and Vietnam, and virtually every post-colonial conflict, and many others. Calculations of support do not remain static.

The bitter pill here, at least for me, is your implication that some parties have no choice but to accept whatever is forced upon them by anyone with the power and will to do so.

Although it may be meant as impartial analysis, is can come off as a de facto acceptance of injustice at the hands of any nation who can get away with it. The scorpion stings; the powerful loot and plunder. A bully stole my lunch today. So what? That's what bullies do.

You may have been marinating in this logic for years, but not all of us have. When we see our elected (!) leaders echoing, nearly verbatim, the verbiage used by the country that was until very recently the enemy we were all taught to fear and, most importantly, never to trust, in order to "bring peace" to a nation that said enemy wantonly invaded and is continuing to indiscriminately attack, it raises eyebrows. Hearing you say, "well, that's just the way it is; every man for himself" sounds close enough to endorsement to the fact - and I believe it is a fact - that our administration is now working for russian leadership, that it's difficult to remember that your goal is to remain objective.

And, worse than that, it doesn't inspire confidence in either our individual leaders or our system at large.

^This. I've come to value the commentary of 02Pilot, he describes the situation with clarity and makes things easier to understand.  Unfortunately, to paraphrase a line from Full Metal Jacket "It's the big E36 M3 sandwich and all of Ukraine is going to have to take a bite."  To folks who remember the time when the Russians (USSR) were our mortal enemy, having the President of the United States parroting a Russian leader's talking points is jarring to say the least.  

Some of you guys should focus less on shooting the messenger and more on the understanding the message. 02 and others have done a great job describing the current situation and possible outcomes. You don't like those outcomes and propose your own fairy tale endings that aren't supported by the reality of the situation. War sucks. The good guy doesn't always win, and often everyone loses. The "winner" just loses less. Negotiations happen when there is no clear winning side and both realize that they have more to lose than gain. It appears that we have been at that point for some time, though Putin has much less concern about his losses. 
 

In reply to DarkMonohue :

As I've noted before, the concept of justice is highly subjective and not especially useful beyond the realm of understanding domestic popular sentiment. The strong do as they will, and the weak suffer as they must.

That said, nuances matter. It would be wrong to suggest that Ukraine has no agency in determining its fate. It has options, it has supporters, it has some domestic capabilities. The problem it faces right now is that the first two are in flux and diminishing, which in turn is narrowing the available path forward. What I am suggesting is that the longer Ukraine maintains unrealistic demands for a settlement, the fewer options it will have for influencing the nature of that peace, and this will almost certainly be to its disadvantage.

As to the historical US-Russia relationship, the public narrative is oversimplified to say the least. Even in the midst of arguably the most serious crisis of the Cold War - the Cuban Missile Crisis - there was communication and negotiation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, both directly through official channels, and indirectly through the RFK backchannel to the KGB via the Russian Embassy and a US journalist. Both sides recognized that they had to be willing to trust the other to the extent necessary to resolve the crisis; they also knew there was value, and indeed necessity, in keeping this out of the public eye. Sure, there is every reason to question Russian motives and promises - that's why any settlement needs to be enforceable by some means. The problem is that Ukraine is currently running out of ways to make this happen, as it needs external support to do so, and alienating that support (regardless of the reasons that is happening) is counterproductive.

In reply to 02Pilot :

I very much appreciate your historical,factual observations on this situation. I mentioned Korea because I saw some historical paralells.  Can you please remind us how many Ukrainians died  under Stalin and why the Ukrainians may so dislike their Russian neighbors? I have no faith that our current leadership is up to the task at hand. 

In reply to TRoglodyte :

Somewhere north of 2.5 million Ukrainians died in the Holodomor; there is little agreement on the precise numbers, for fairly obvious reasons.

I know that memories are long when it comes to such things. But they are not destiny. Britain and France fought dozens of wars against each other over a period of some 800 years, and yet now they are allies (I found the agonizing in the British government over whether to invite the French to the 200th anniversary commemorations of Trafalagar in 2005 particularly amusing). Despite more recent history, Japan and South Korea are now allies as well, as are Germany and Poland, and the list goes on. This doesn't mean they've forgotten their history (I seem to recall seeing Agincourt mentioned somewhere in the UK press the last time they were scheduled to meet in the World Cup), just that they're not shackled to it as the world moves relentlessly forward.

I wonder when the US would capitulate when faced with the inevitable defeat by the Chinese? Would you dispassionately say "well, looks like we lost so we better make the best deal we can and save a state or two."

That's really what's being suggested here from observers far removed from the battlefield and from the emotional fight for homeland. Ukraine is willing to put their lives on the line and it's really up to them how far they want to take it. Predicting that they will use logic to make the best of the situation that has been foisted on them is removing emotion and patriotism from the equation. It wouldn't work in the US and there's no point in assuming that it will work in the Ukraine.  And any capitulation or deal making with Russia at this point will probably be result in the war resuming in the future so they are really faced with very little choice whether they get American support or not. It would be helpful though if America either declared for one side or the other, or declared they were stepping out completely. I'm sure Zelenskyy would appreciate clarity, Putin would appreciate clarity and the rest of us following world events would also appreciate clarity.

In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :

Comparing this to a US-Chinese conflict is apples and oranges. The US and China are near-peer competitors; Russia and Ukraine are not. The calculus changes.

All the emotion in the world won't stand up in the face of the facts on the ground. And clarity is not something you will find in international relations; ambiguity and uncertainty allow for the greatest range of policy options. If your rivals know where you stand, they can maneuver confidently; if they don't, they have to keep guessing, and sometimes they'll guess wrong.

02Pilot said:

Somewhere north of 2.5 million Ukrainians died in the Holodomor; there is little agreement on the precise numbers, for fairly obvious reasons.

It's interesting if you examine the famine because once you get past the propaganda it starts to look more like the modern response to covid, what with the government trying to rush things back to business as usual while subversive elements worked to make the whole thing worse.

It's probably already been mentioned, but there are parallels to WWll. Eastern Europe got served the sh-t sandwich in the end there. It outrages our sense of justice, but short of a miracle, a failure to reach an agreement now will probably result in years more of death and destruction, followed by a sh-t sandwich for Ukraine anyway.

In reply to Kreb (Forum Supporter) :

Unfortunately this is true. If the United States decided to takeover Mexico who would stop us? America spent a lot of blood and treasure in Korea,  that war technically has not ended yet.

In reply to bearmtnmartin (Forum Supporter) :

I wonder when the US would capitulate when faced with the inevitable defeat by the Chinese? Would you dispassionately say "well, looks like we lost so we better make the best deal we can and save a state or two."

Yes! if China somehow overpowered the U.S. and took the west coast, and we were unable to drive them out, yes. Rather than use up all of our resources in a stalemate and risk losing everything, we might take that deal. To not at least have it on the table would be irresponsible. Live to fight another day works better than fighting to the last man. 

That's really what's being suggested here from observers far removed from the battlefield and from the emotional fight for homeland. Ukraine is willing to put their lives on the line and it's really up to them how far they want to take it.
 

Yes, it is. They are under no obligation to take any deal. I'll also point out that you too are an observer far from the battlefield, and all in Ukraine may not share your emotional plea to fight to the last man. 

Predicting that they will use logic to make the best of the situation that has been foisted on them is removing emotion and patriotism from the equation. It wouldn't work in the US and there's no point in assuming that it will work in the Ukraine.  And any capitulation or deal making with Russia at this point will probably be result in the war resuming in the future so they are really faced with very little choice whether they get American support or not. It would be helpful though if America either declared for one side or the other, or declared they were stepping out completely. I'm sure Zelenskyy would appreciate clarity, Putin would appreciate clarity and the rest of us following world events would also appreciate clarity.

That's why someone needs to do the math and figure out what is in the best interest of the country. Math is unemotional. While nothing is certain, it can give insight on the odds of winning, depending on what winning means to them. The math doesn't care if you are willing to die to avenge the dead, you are just dead, and one less soldier on the battlefield. 
 

No one is capitulating to Russia. Russia attacked Ukraine and took land. We would like them to stop attacking Ukraine. That's it. Expecting them to give land back, especially land they took before the current war, is unrealistic. Why would they? For that to happen, Ukraine would have to be a serious threat to take it back or more. And as of now, they aren't. It's wrong and it's sucks but welcome to the history of mankind. Ukraine can take that deal and use the "peace" to fortify it's defenses and alliances, since no one trusts Russia. Russia got it's nose bloodied big time, so I wouldn't expect them to try again too soon. If Putin knew what it would have cost back when he invaded, I don't think he would have done it. His math was wrong. But he doesn't give a E36 M3 about his people and is willing to sacrifice them to save face. 
 

America is very much on the side of Ukraine, but doesn't see a an acceptable path to victory and wants to end the fighting/cut their losses. Right or wrong, that is their decision to make, just like it's Ukraine's decision to continue to fight or make a deal. 

Xceler8x said:

Opti said:

In reply to Xceler8x :

It has been the most likely outcome for years. Im not a fan, but its the way the world works, no matter how unfair it is.

It's how the world works if we let it work that way. 

We are not powerless nor is Ukraine. We've proven that. We collectively have stopped one of the most powerful armies in the world with Ukraine. If we walk away now then yes, the world is unfair and the little guy will get trampled no matter how unjust it is. 

If we support Ukraine we have a very high chance of helping David withstand Goliath. 

We have supported Ukraine, and the war map has remained largely unchanged since Nov 22. 

I stand by what I said, Its how the world works, your platitude doesn't change it.

02Pilot said:

In reply to Xceler8x :

To your comment to Opti, the accumulated cost of supporting Ukraine over time has clearly tipped the cost:benefit scales for some, just as it did in Korea and Vietnam, and virtually every post-colonial conflict, and many others. Calculations of support do not remain static.

You are correct, calculations aren't static, and anything can happen in war, but certain things tend to happen. One of them is support for a war tends to drop the longer it goes. We've also had a largely unchanged war map for about 2.5 years. Im not saying the calculation was static, just that an unemotional analysis has shown it to be the most likely outcome for quite some time, and the longer it goes on, the more inevitable that outcome is.

Trump will go down in history as the worlds biggest pinochio, and yet, ironically, always,  he always tells you what he is going to do in a very straightforward manner. We, as a species, always ignore him.

This was from what might have been his very first serious presidential speech in Vegas.   I apologize because I believe that this crosses the line on the "No Politics" mandate on this forum, but I also believe that it goes a long way to explaining why we are were we are, vis-a-vis the Russia-US-Ukraine fiasco. Quote from Mother Jones. I have heard the actual taped dialogue way back before he was elected the first time.

While researching the strange story of two Russian gun aficionados who cultivated Donald Trump’s presidential campaign via the National Rifle Association, we came across a little-noticed but noteworthy episode concerning Trump and US sanctions against Russia. Sanctions have been a source of extraordinary conflict between the president and Congress and a matter of clear significance to special counsel Robert Mueller’s ongoing investigation.

Just a month after Trump announced his campaign for the White House, he spoke directly to Maria Butina, the protégé of the powerful Russian banking official and Putin ally Alexander Torshin. During a public question and answer session at FreedomFest, a conservative gathering in Las Vegas in July 2015, Butina asked Trump what he would do as president about “damaging” US sanctions. Trump suggested he would get rid of them

 

“I am visiting from Russia,” Butina said into the mic.

“Ahhhhh, Putin!” Trump interjected, prompting laughter from the audience as he added a mocking riff about the current president: “Good friend of Obama, Putin. He likes Obama a lot. Go ahead.”

“My question will be about foreign politics,” Butina continued. “If you will be elected as president, what will be your foreign politics especially in the relationships with my country? And do you want to continue the politics of sanctions that are damaging of both economy [sic]? Or you have any other ideas?”

After going off on Obama and digressing into trade policy, Trump responded: “I know Putin, and I’ll tell you what, we get along with Putin… I believe I would get along very nicely with Putin, OK? And I mean, where we have the strength. I don’t think you’d need the sanctions. I think we would get along very, very well.”

Trump did not appear to know who Butina was. But Torshin claims to have met Trump three months prior and had a “jovial exchange” with him at the NRA annual convention in Nashville, Tennessee.

Opti said:

02Pilot said:

In reply to Xceler8x :

To your comment to Opti, the accumulated cost of supporting Ukraine over time has clearly tipped the cost:benefit scales for some, just as it did in Korea and Vietnam, and virtually every post-colonial conflict, and many others. Calculations of support do not remain static.

You are correct, calculations aren't static, and anything can happen in war, but certain things tend to happen. One of them is support for a war tends to drop the longer it goes. We've also had a largely unchanged war map for about 2.5 years. Im not saying the calculation was static, just that an unemotional analysis has shown it to be the most likely outcome for quite some time, and the longer it goes on, the more inevitable that outcome is.

 

Does the continued destruction of resources and people with no significant change in outcome benefit anyone? Would it serve a purpose to a geopolitical agenda?

In reply to NOHOME :

Well... I think this may not say what they are saying it says (!).  Also, considering the source (of the interpretation, not the quote).  It doesn't really surprise me they interpret it that way.

That quote could easily and reasonable be interpreted as (paraphrasing here of course):  "We don't need sanctions, we have the most powerful military and economy in the world, that should be enough".  This also follows along with the generally stated "peace through strength" policy the admin is (supposed to be) following.  Or even "I don't need sanctions, I can do it with my strong relationship". Though I think the former, with a bit of the later mixed in, is likely the most appropriate interpretation.

As I have mentioned previously, there are certain (e.g. highly politically charged) people, when you are reading interpretations of what they are saying, you have to be VERY careful and aware of what the source is! Willful misinterpretation is very common (lack of clear communication is CERTAINLY contributing to this of course) and I generally don't take any interpretation as reasonable until I can see / read the entirety of the context involved.

Now...  I am not sure we have seen much of the "peace through strength" (even if just in the form of words) policy implimented at all via Ukraine/Russia (unless you count the removal of aid that?, I don't really).  It certainly has been in Gaza, and seems to very much be with Iran.

Honestly, I see the current proposal, as outlined (and likely of no surprise to anyone here I suspect) as almost certainly dead on arrival.  The Ukrainians clearly have little interest in it.  The Russians continue to state maximalist goals, and (at least indicate) they would have no interest in it without additional, very Russia favorable, additions.

One bit of perspective to consider is that the US is not some sort of god like arbitrator of this situation.  The US does not get to decide how this ends or who agrees to what.  Certainly the US has a great amount of power here to potentially sway either side, but when it comes down to it both Ukraine AND Russia need to agree to something for it to happen.

I did see an interview by a reported expert on Russia talking about their negotiation style.  The general idea is that they are highly transactional in nature.  That is, if it can't be quantified (counted, it's physically manifested) in some way, it's essentially meaningless to the Russians.  As a theoretical example:  If there is an agreement for a simple long term ceasefire, that essentially means Russia can attack again at anytime (nothing stopping them, quantitative wise).  If there is a simple long term ceasefire with an agreement not to attack ever again by the Russians (e.g. no consequences), that is essentially interpreted by the Russians as Russia can attack again at any time, but might have a good chance of surprise.

These are not the statements of a country that even wants a ceasefire, much less a full halt to the war:

-----

The official Kremlin spokesperson and the Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position....

....Peskov and Shoigu continued to place conditions on Russia's agreement to Trump's proposed full ceasefire that would further Putin's goal of weakening the Ukrainian military, likely to prepare for future Russian aggression.....
 

Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements.

As for things happening on "the ground":

Russia launched another rather large missile and drone attack on Ukraine.  As with some of the more recent attacks, they seem to be focused on civilian populations (or at least not seemingly to try hard to avoid them), in this case Kyiv.

----

Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025.

...Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s strike series injured at least 80 Ukrainians and killed 9 people in Kyiv City alone, and damaged residential areas, energy infrastructure, and other buildings in five areas of the city...

-----

Russia appear to have a bit of an "issue" at a rather large ammunition depot located south east of Moscow.  By "issue" I mean lots of explosions, and by explosions I mean REALLY big explosions!!!

The 51st GRAU Arsenal 60 km from Moscow Was Destroyed:

The 51st arsenal of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) of the russian Ministry of Defense had a design capacity of 264,000 tons of various ammunition and was protected by the most heavily concentrated air defense system in the russian federation

https://en.defence-ua.com/news/the_51st_grau_arsenal_60_km_from_moscow_was_destroyed_why_it_was_the_most_difficult_target_and_what_was_hidden_inside-14272.html

New satellite image shows tremendous damage after one of Russia's largest ammo depots exploded

https://www.businessinsider.com/new-satellite-image-shows-damage-huge-russian-ammo-depot-exploded-2025-4