In reply to aircooled :
There's already a Wikipedia article...
Around 8:47 p.m. EST, less than 30 seconds before the collision, an air traffic controller asked the helicopter crew whether they had Flight 5342 in sight. The crew confirmed visual contact and requested "visual separation" from the airliner—meaning they would visually acquire and maintain separation from the aircraft on their own—which was approved by the controller.[29][39] Moments later, the controller instructed the helicopter to pass behind Flight 5342.[29][40] The two aircraft collided at less than 300 feet (91 m) altitude, with the airplane flying at 128 mph (206 km/h) upon impact, causing the helicopter to explode and crash into the Potomac River.[41] The CRJ-700's radio transponder ceased transmitting about 2,400 ft (730 m) short of Runway 33, where it was intending to land.[29][40]
Incidentally, this is the first Wikipedia article I've seen that had notes for excessive citations.
02Pilot said:
From what I've been able to discover, the helo was on something called "Route 4," [...] If the ADS-B data is correct, it suggests the helo was too high. While the helo crew claimed they had the CRJ in sight and were maintaining visual separation, it is possible they were referring to another aircraft and never saw the accident aircraft.
Do we know that the track is actually "ADS-B data"? I thought DoD had gotten an exemption to run with it off, and so it was more likely the track came from radar? (speaking of, where did that track come from... since most of the open source web-radar trackers never show DoD flights in the DC area?)
In reply to sleepyhead the buffalo :
Most military transport aircraft run with ADS-B on. Fighters do not. I watch ADS-B in my area (navy base near by) and I commonly see Blackhawks and C-130's on ADS-B. When I see (hear) an F-18, for example, it's never has ADS-B activated.
In reply to Pete. (l33t FS) :
OK, Runway 33 it is then. Here is the GPS approach to Runway 33. Note marker IDTEK is showing an altitude of 490 ft. Collision altitude is apparently 300 ft (maybe)
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/30/image_o0sgYzy_thumb.png)
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/30/25 3:18 p.m.
What the PSA flight was doing was common practice at DCA: it flew the ILS approach to 1, then was directed to break off and dogleg right to land on 33.
Some more info. What appears to be a radar track (taken from a video). The lower left number appears to be altitude in hundreds of feet.
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/30/img_f348b328ce8b-1_xDxkjUj_thumb.jpeg)
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/30/img_f938ab905a2b-1_jmfii3t_thumb.jpeg)
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/30/img_df3ca67edc83-1_LcrPpvL_thumb.jpeg)
Last two radar tracks laid over air route map. "Looks" like the helocopter was right on the route, maybe a bit high.
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/30/flight-path_thumb.png)
Can always count on my fellow GRM'ers to get into the weeds of every topic Iol.
The amount of E36 M3 I accidentally learn on this forum.
BenB
HalfDork
1/30/25 4:54 p.m.
I wonder what the orange "CA" markers are? Collision alerts for the controller? Also, the TCAS collision avoidance system has traffic alerts disabled below 1000 ft AGL, so the CRJ crew didn't get a "Climb! Climb!" alert.
BenB said:
I wonder what the orange "CA" markers are? Collision alerts for the controller? Also, the TCAS collision avoidance system has traffic alerts disabled below 1000 ft AGL, so the CRJ crew didn't get a "Climb! Climb!" alert.
My dad was pretty involved in STARS, he confirmed its Collison Alert and there's also an audible warning.
Based on the tracks, it looks like they were about nose to nose once the CRJ started the circle so probably almost no relative motion as well as being mixed in with ground lighting.
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/30/25 6:45 p.m.
The CRJ would have been banking left, meaning the right wing would have been high and visibility from the cockpit to the right limited at best; with both pilots focused on the approach in controlled airspace, they probably wouldn't have been actively looking for traffic. The same cannot be said for the UH-60 crew. Since they were nearly head-on at impact, it's hard to understand how the Blackhawk pilots didn't see the landing lights, but that whole area is lit up like a Christmas tree basically 24/7, so it's not hard to think that they just missed it in the visual clutter.
I was going to say that although position lights on planes and helicopters are very easy to see at night, determining distance can be very difficult. The landing lights though, yeah, those would be pretty damn obvious, a lot easier to tell the distance, and can be clearly seen in the video. Those lights would be very very bright as they got close (looks like out the left / front of the helicopter). Maybe they got turned around and where looking the wrong direction, or thought they saw the plane, but were tracking the wrong one (?)
I am sure the CRJ's crew was busy with the approach, but the helicopter certainly should have been on the lookout (I believe the audio release indicates they where). You would be amazed though how distracted, or self-imobilizing pilots and crew can be with each other though. One case I remember was a plane with 4 flight instructors on board... ran out of fuel... essentially because they all assumed the others knew what they were doing and never checked the fuel or wanted to question anyone else!! (that BTW is know as a Human Factor)
The accident investigation will certainly fault at least one of the pilots (it almost always does to some extent since the pilot is ultimately in charge, no mater the circumstances), but this is really looking like the controllers guidance are a big factor here. Pilots are under no compulsion to follow controller guidance (as noted, they are ultimately in charge), but it's kind of looking like these pilots were guided into a very dangerous situation.
Still a bit amazed they let these flight paths so closely intersect. Clearly (hopefully), normal operation would not have them overlap, time wise at least, so much.
As with most all of these accidents, there are multiple factors, which combine to make it possible/likely.
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/30/25 8:12 p.m.
Couple things now being discussed:
- UH-60 pilots were equipped with Gen 3 NVGs, and may have been using them. These reduce peripheral vision substantially, as well as reducing depth perception.
- DCA tower staff normally goes from two controllers to one at 2130 local; there is a report that the supervisor may have switched to reduced staff early, potentially contributing to the remaining controller struggling to maintain situational awareness due to workload.
Extra sad that the jet co-pilot/first officer?'s father is a retired army helicopter pilot whom flew to the pentagon numerous times.
myf16n
Reader
1/31/25 1:03 a.m.
I would be very surprised if the H60 crew was on NVGs. There was so much ambient light that I'd expect the NVGs to be washed out and blinding the crew. Stranger things have happened I guess.
NOHOME
MegaDork
1/31/25 10:05 a.m.
In reply to aircooled :
If not "a bit too high" the collision would not have happened.
My understanding, if I can believe anything anymore, is that there is a 200 ft ceiling for military copters flying that river route. I can see where there is a good reason for it.
Until shortly before the collision, the copter WAS flying the 200 ft ceiling. Then it popped up to 300 ish. If I were trying to fly a copter "give or take 100 ft" would not be a big deal but I want to think that the military runs a tighter ship? Not trying to Tom Clancy this story up, but someone for some reason pulled the Collective to get up to 300 ft.
What is also interesting is that the flight paths are allowed to cross with 100 ft of separation. If I were a passenger looking out the window as the helicopter approached ( albeit 100 ft below) I might trigger a code-brown for my seat because that sure would look like a helicopter coming at my window.
NOHOME said:
In reply to aircooled :
If not "a bit too high" the collision would not have happened.
My understanding, if I can believe anything anymore, is that there is a 200 ft ceiling for military copters flying that river route. I can see where there is a good reason for it.
Until shortly before the collision, the copter WAS flying the 200 ft ceiling. Then it popped up to 300 ish. If I were trying to fly a copter "give or take 100 ft" would not be a big deal but I want to think that the military runs a tighter ship? Not trying to Tom Clancy this story up, but someone for some reason pulled the Collective to get up to 300 ft.
What is also interesting is that the flight paths are allowed to cross with 100 ft of separation. If I were a passenger looking out the window as the helicopter approached ( albeit 100 ft below) I might trigger a code-brown for my seat because that sure would look like a helicopter coming at my window.
That's the data point that stands out above all. If there ever was a case for staying in ones (3D) lanes, this is it. Is there some sort of black box that includes the conversations that go on in the helicopters? It's hard to imagine how both the pilot and co-pilot would be so unaware. Even if the instruments failed, I'd think that there'd be a lot of visual references if you are flying 50 percent higher than your allowed ceiling on a clear night.
I made the mistake of spending five minutes on twitter last night. That was enough to make me physically ill.
NOHOME said:
In reply to aircooled :
....What is also interesting is that the flight paths are allowed to cross with 100 ft of separation. If I were a passenger looking out the window as the helicopter approached ( albeit 100 ft below) I might trigger a code-brown for my seat because that sure would look like a helicopter coming at my window.
That is my big wonder. I would be MASSIVELY surprised if there was any consideration that a 100 ft separation across and approach path was considered even remotely reasonable!! That is VERY VERY close, aircraft separation wise. As noted, I don't know the actual statistics, but I am pretty confident that that vast majority of mid-air collisions (which are rare) occur at the approach end of a runway, it would be insane to allow that kind of separation in the most dangerous area! There is a saying though: "FAA regulations are written in blood". (that is: blood has to spill to create regulations)
My guess would be, if there are any regulation changes, it would be clamping down much harder on separation requirements (which would be making sure no one is any where close in those routes when someone is landing)
For comparison, here are the VFR separation rules, and this is from objects, that don't move.
![VFR | Visual Flight Rules - Teknologi](https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2F4.bp.blogspot.com%2F-3bB7eKHXX90%2FWKZvnk0W_kI%2FAAAAAAAALU4%2FnGda8J8wfCcs1-2eWb-ojR70CArgasqBQCLcB%2Fs640%2FVisual%252BFlight%252BRequirements.jpg&f=1&nofb=1&ipt=c8c5de5d83154facb31771c014b3c8e1db3d53c9836b393a09174530b473588f&ipo=images)
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/31/25 1:13 p.m.
If the helo had indeed maintained visual separation, there would have been horizontal separation. If we are operating on the assumption that the helo was above the maximum 200' MSL, we must also assume that the crew did not see the CRJ until it was too late (if at all). If they were high but saw it, they would have slowed or changed course to maintain separation as required; if they were on their assigned flight path and below maximum altitude and didn't see it, it would have passed above them.
In that airspace, I doubt there will be significant regulatory changes. There's nowhere to go, and it's too busy with both arrivals/departures and helo traffic for one to wait for the other. Requiring more people in the tower might happen, and perhaps some requirement for radio compatibility so that all aircraft in the airspace can hear each other.
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/31/25 1:36 p.m.
This just popped up from VASAviation: a segment of traffic near DCA roughly 24 hours before the accident wherein there are several TCAS alerts on inbound aircraft because of another helo. I suspect this is extremely common and is only being posted because of the circumstances, but it's interesting nonetheless.
What is that saying about disasters come in threes? The Jeju Air Co. disaster in South Korea, the Russian downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, and now the American Airlines/Blackhawk helicopter Washington collision.
Years ago, I was at work one late afternoon standing outside having a smoke and facing north towards the 300 foot hill which the airport's runway begins from. It was summertime with clear skies and I could hear our 737 approaching from the Southeast coming in for a landing. Suddenly out of the blue, a small plane swung in from the east and started landing in front of the 737 which had to abort its landing and go full throttle and pull up and to the right to avoid running over the Piper. They couldn't have been more than 1/4 mile apart and I never read or heard anything about it in the paper or TV. I wonder if the airliner pilot had a little road rage thing going on afterwards at the airport.
I was standing at the location labeled "Viewpoint" so less than 2 miles from the runway.
![](https://s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/prod.mm.com/uploads/2025/01/31/google-earth-minot-airport-1_thumb.jpg)
Ward Carroll just posted a new video about this.
https://youtu.be/MdOU2BGHwHo?si=Z_ll7fumgRoSYXde
He mentions it, but I think sightlines are going to be key. I remember reading other reports about midairs where the NTSB mapped out all the sightlines and pillar obstruction patterns.
So is the helicopter traffic part of the security apparatus, or training? It's been mentioned that they do a lot of flight training in the area. Perhaps that should be rethought.
02Pilot
PowerDork
1/31/25 4:33 p.m.
In reply to Kreb (Forum Supporter) :
The helo in question (PAT 25) is part of a specialized unit out of Belvoir that was carrying out a "continuity of government" training mission. In other words, getting the decision-makers out of the blast zone when the balloon goes up. Hard to train for that anywhere else.