History in the Making: Russian Invasion

If the Jeju aircraft had skidded off the end of the runway into a sand trap, catch fence, mudflats, etc., It would not have been nearly such a tragedy. How a reinforced concrete structure to hold up the ILS equipment was approved is beyond me.

I was concerned that this was some kind of Russian operation to distract from their little shootdown incident, but it appears to be an unfortunate coincidence that 2 jet airliners hit the ground with a loss of hydraulics in 2 days.

in other aviation news, Russia has figured out how to make Shahed drones in country in large quantities.

https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/27/europe/russia-ukraine-war-drones-alabuga-factory-intl-invs/index.html

Ran across an interesting video that basically covers the whole history of Russia invading other countries from the Tsarist period almost up to the present-day situation in Ukraine. Seeing it all together really puts Russia's complaints about "NATO expansion" in perspective:

Just saw on the news Ukraine has E36 M3 down the Russian Natural gas pipeline. Not breaking news, but recent:

Al Jazeera news article

No Time said:

Just saw on the news Ukraine has E36 M3 down the Russian Natural gas pipeline. Not breaking news, but recent:

Al Jazeera news article

We know what you meant to type, but what you actually wrote is funnier and more appropriate.

In reply to DarkMonohue :

Probably a mental lapse due to where I was sitting when I typed it 😁

- Report and video of another first.  The Ukranians have been arming their remote control boats around Crimea with anti-aircraft missiles to counter the Russian use of helicopters to shot at them.  They have the first recorded hit (maybe kill) on a helicopter.  The R-73 (AA-11 Archer NATO designation) is essentially the second gen equivalent of the Russian Sidewinder.  

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/12/31/im-hit-im-going-downnaval-drone-downs-russian-helicopter/

- Ukrainian pilots and mechanics have completed their training for the Mirage 2000 that they will receive sometime early this year.

- 200 Ukrainian airman have completed basic flight, ground and language training in the UK before training on the F-16. Language training I suspect is to make training easier, also, English is the international language for pilots / aviation, so if they want to talk to any controllers, they will need it. (Napa airport in northern CA is / was(?) the primary training base for Japan airlines, it was super obvious when one of them came on the radio!)

- Russians have halted all submarine operations in the Mediterranean after loosing their base in Syria

- The Ukrainians appear to be doing some sort of offensive operations in the north eastern area of the Kursk incursion area.  Essentially along the highway that runs to Kursk.  This is likely in response to the Russians over extending themselves in the areas (the have been taking heavy losses there) and leaving some weak points the Ukranians are exploiting.  I certainly do not expect any sort of significant offensive here.   Is the great Russian summer offensive sputtering?  Likely related to below also:

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025.[1] Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.[2]...

Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024....

Al jazeera is reporting 430,000 russian casualties in the year 2024 alone. 

cite:  https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/3/highest-price-for-war-russia-lost-430000-soldiers-in-2024-says-ukraine

I know we know that's a lot, and we've seen the territorial gains (pretty minimal) and yeah, it really sucked seeing the chats explode with things like "The lines are crumbling in Niu-York!!!!" back when that was happening, but I've just been given a GIGANTIC lesson in perspective and thought I'd share (because honestly, I really didn't have a clue).

So I've just returned from a trip to Kramatorsk and Bilytske.  For perspective, we were single digit miles from the contact line, and were so close to Pokrovsk that we could hear the explosions (near constantly) from the shelling.  here's what that looks like on a map:

Here's the part I was missing in all of this though:

That little excursion to that area took me over 4-HOURS to drive to from Dnipro (a city that's already 1000km/600mi from the western border).  russia lost nearly as many soldiers this YEAR as they have in all the combat leading up to this year and they are STILL 4-hours straight drive from Dnipro City (and Dnipro is about 7-hours from Kyiv)

This is what it looks like when you compare that 4-hour drive to the entire country:

My point?  Ukraine is HUGE!!!!!!  I mean, I know the russians don't have to conquer every last square inch of Ukraine but knowing they've lost nearly half-a-million men and still have 4-hours to go in a straight-shot drive to get to that major urban center was just mind-boggling.

And if we want to look at how much land is still WEST of that urban center, well...  I was in full "iron-@ss and energy drink" mode and I still had to stop 3-hours east of Lviv when I ran out of steam after going full-chat all day (approx 16 hours of driving in all that day).

Honest to goodness, I had no idea the scale of the gains the russians were making when compared to Ukraine as a whole.  It just seems so.... nonexistant!  I mean we see the map move, but its seldom by much and they wasted half-a-million people to do it and they still have so-darn-MUCH further to go still!

I guess if I were to put it another way, I'd say: "If russia is really intent on getting anywhere close to any of the biggest urban centers, then me thinks their mail order bride business is going to be berking BOOMING for the foreseeable future".

Ok, next order of business.  What I didn't see when I was out there: 

"Fatigue/hopelessness".  People looked clean, sharp, sober, equipment was running, and people seemed like they were in good spirits.  Of course, the gosh-darn civilians are STILL living out there.  Coffee shops were open (yup.  with constant audible explosions in the background), and you could still get petrol from the fuel stations and still pay with your credit card while doing it.  The lady in the kitchen at the house we stopped at (The soldiers call her "chef") had Kutia (A Ukrainian Christmas treat) made and on the table for everyone, and even though my butt was raw from sitting for days on end in the drivers seat of the truck she absolutely would not take "no" for an answer seemed so darn happy to make us sit down at her table and feed us some Varenyky that she cooked up just for us.  My mind could not comprehend what was happening.  The mixed population of active duty military and civilians was something I've never seen outside of WW2 films.

Convoy of trucks and armor?  Check.  They pass and then you see a guy across the street walking his French bulldog like it's just another normal day in Tha 'Kraine.  Stop to look at a bombed out school and some kid sticks his head out the second story window of his house to check out the truck.  Order a cup of coffee and the three guys behind ya are in plate carriers and are shouldering rifles (one pays with the contactless option from his smart phone).  Drone jammers are on about half of the vehicles here, and the guy outside has a gigantic barbecue and is getting ready for the lunch rush.  Canvas covered supply trucks are being followed by a freshly washed Mercedes SUV.  Old ladies are gathering on the corner to gossip.  Christmas lights are hung and turned on and flashing at night.  Some of the houses are bombed/abandoned/damaged, some are occupied by military, and some have perfectly manicured yards with shaped bushes and everything!  But don't turn right onto the road out of the fuel station at the edge of town, that one's prone to russian drone attacks.

Insane.

Also, Christmas spirit?  Alive and well.  Here are some pockets a couple troops decorated for themselves:

There are a lot more Christmas decorations at that sign too.  The 25th airborne even welded up some rebar and decorated it like a Christmas tree with spent artillery shell casings, ammo crates, etc.

crazy times.

In reply to Hungary Bill (Forum Supporter) :

The ability of people to adapt to their situation, even if it is pretty "insane", is rather impressive.  As noted, the Russians are gaining ground, but in perspective, especially for the price being paid it's pretty insignificant.  Your note on jamming is also mentioned below.  

An update on the recent Ukrainian offensive:

Ukrainian forces resumed offensive operations in at least three areas within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast and made tactical advances on January 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted multiple roughly company-sized mechanized assaults in the Berdin-Novosotnitsky direction (northeast of Sudzha) in three waves of attack using roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also intensified offensive operations in the direction of Leonidovo (southeast of Korenevo) and conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault near Pushkarnoye (east of Sudzha).[2] Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in fields southwest and south of Berdin and entered the southern part of the settlement.[3] Russian milbloggers published updated maps of the Kursk area of operations that indicate that Ukrainian forces also occupy Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, Martynovka, and Mikhaylovka (all northeast of Sudzha and southwest of Berdin) as of January 5 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently entered Novosotnitsky (just east of Berdin); and advanced in fields west of Yamskaya Step (immediately northwest of Berdin) and west of Novaya Sorochina (north of Sudzha and northwest of Berdin).[4] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces also conducted offensive operations near Nikolskiy and Alexandriya (east and southeast of Leonidovo, respectively) and north of Russkaya Konopelka (east of Sudzha) towards Pushkarnoye in small infantry groups but did not provide details about the extent of any possible Ukrainian advances in these areas.[5] Russian milbloggers largely expressed concern that the renewed Ukrainian effort in Kursk Oblast may be a diversionary effort and claimed that it is too early to determine whether these operations in Kursk could be part of a future main effort.[6]

Russian forces also advanced southeast of Sudzha and counterattacked against intensified Ukrainian attacks southeast of Korenevo and north of Sudzha on January 5

Russian sources expressed concern about the Russian military's ability to react to Ukraine's ongoing combined arms efforts to integrate electronic warfare (EW) and long-range strike capabilities with ground operations. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on January 5 that Ukrainian EW interference during Ukrainian assaults in Kursk Oblast prevented Russian forces from operating drones in the area, degrading Russian forces’ ability to defend against Ukrainian mechanized attacks.[15] Russian milbloggers claimed that drones with fiber optic cables are one of the few Russian drone variants that consistently resist Ukrainian EW countermeasures, although some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were able to use some first-person view (FPV) and Lancet drones.[16] Russian officials claimed on January 5 that Russian forces downed three unspecified Ukrainian missiles over Kursk Oblast, suggesting that Ukrainian forces may be attempting to integrate longer-range strike capabilities with ground operations and tactical EW systems.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted HIMARS strikes near Bolshoye Soldatskoye and other unspecified areas in Kursk Oblast to prevent Russian forces from deploying reinforcements, artillery systems, and drone operators.[18] Widespread Russian concern over Russia's ability to respond to improved Ukrainian EW technology and long-range strike capabilities indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to quickly adapt to Ukrainian battlefield innovations. Reports that Ukrainian forces are using long-range fires to interdict Russian rear areas and EW to degrade Russian drones in support of Ukrainian mechanized advances indicate that Ukrainian forces operating in Kursk are employing more effective combined arms tactics.

This just popped up and seems like it would be of interest to some here. I haven't watched it yet, so I have no comments at this point.

In reply to 02Pilot :

Thanks, I will have to take a look.  Very quick, first minute comment:  Using the term "slap on the wrist" is an unfortunate translation to whatever he is saying in Ukrainian.  Of course in the US, "slap on the wrist" means minor meaningless punishment, which I am pretty sure he does not mean to imply, but I suspect might get used against him...

Also, I hate that I have to ask this, but does anyone know what Friedman's "slant" is? (If one?). I have heard his name before, but it sure where.

In reply to aircooled :

I'm not sure he has a political slant in the traditional sense, but from what I've heard in past interviews, he's certainly inclined to a Wilsonian idealist/cooperation, not competition worldview. His background (he discusses it in the prologue) gives him a better starting point than most on this issue, at least, so I'll be interested to see how he approaches it. He also mentions that he's slated to interview Putin, which should make for an interesting counterpoint.

Shoot, I forgot to show you guys the other part.

Here's the damage from the IRBM that hit the children's rehab center (Malva Rehab Center, if you want to google it)

We took a collection and raise cash to help them out.  When asked what they needed (we were expecting construction materials, etc), this is what they asked for:

If’n I had to summarize, I’d describe the items we brought as “office supplies and sensory toys for children”. The type of stuff that you need to work targeted muscles to operate (like fine motor skill development sort of stuff). At this point, I'm assuming the gov is helping to rebuild that boiler building.

Regarding the interview:

  Much of it is negotiations related, so should be right down 02's lane.  Zelenskyy seemed to be somewhat open to idea of giving up the occupied areas, which seems a bit new.

 The translation issue that they talk about is interesting.  It does (as noted) make it potentially difficult to perceive subtle aspects of what someone is saying.  I was a bit thrown by what seemed like a translator that sounded VERY similar to Zelenskyy.  Of course, they later note that there was an AI translation done and laid over the video that used Zelenskyy's voice as a basis, which is a good way to go.

 Zelenskyy's disgust for Putin and Russia are pretty obvious.  His refusal to speak extensively in the common (between the two) Russian language is an interesting take.  I think his take on whether Putin "loves his country" is pretty accurate.  He clearly cares little for the people of his country, but certainly likes the concept of it, and what it bring him (and his close buddies).

I found Zelenkii's point about how the hatred and need for revenge by the Ukrainians is not going away anytime soon interesting and relevant.  He even stated that that non-offensive nature of NATO could serve to protect Russia in the future!  Not sure how realistic that is since that would be more of a state action thing, and Russia still has the nukes (as Putin CONSTANTLY reminds everyone of).

Of note, a commenter made the point that nuclear weapons need somewhat regular upkeep (the nuclear fuel degrades).  The US recently spend a significant amount to upgrade it's arsenal (I think it was 60 billion).  That was the same amount the Russians spend for it's entire military... which makes you wonder about the current state of the Russian nuclear arsenal....

In reply to aircooled :

I don't want to flounder so I won't mention any specifics, but I'm not surprised to see the stance start to soften based on some of the recent statements made by the incoming US administration.

In reply to No Time :

Yeah, I think you have to be aware of, and Zelenskyy certainly is based on how he talks about it in the interview, that the US is a primary player here and Zelenskyy needs to "go with the flow" a bit in regards to US policy.  It certainly is of no interest to Zelenskyy to take much of a contrarian view to US policy. 

His approach, in general, seems to be along the lines of "let me show you how we can help / be useful to you" which I think is a very good way to go, especially with the new admin.  His comment about Ukraine having the largest army in Europe seems to imply that Ukraine is willing to be the "watchers on the wall" in regards to Russia.

I am curious what 02's take is on this.  Do you find his approach appropriate, smart, strategic, deceptive, etc?

In reply to aircooled :

It's taken a while to get to this, and I'm only halfway through at the moment, but I can give some thoughts as I continue listening.

Zelensky is understandably emotional, but he comes across as being guided by emotion to a considerable degree, which does not help his case. He's clearly an idealist, talking about things like justice after the conflict, and alluding to dire consequences if the Russians aren't held accountable. It may be desirable, but it's unhelpful in resolving the conflict in a realistic way. His bitterness toward the Budapest Memorandum is again understandable, but reveals his lack of experience in international relations; any serious diplomat would know that a memorandum is largely symbolic and carries little weight.

His reading of US politics is simplistic and falls along party lines, but fails to recognize that those are fungible, that party identities are highly dynamic, and that the GOP of 2000 or 2008 is radically different from the GOP today. Likewise, he seems to take no account of domestic factors in Western European counties; it's impossible to think about Germany's position on Ukraine and Russia when it was deeply invested in Russia economically and increasingly dependent on it for energy.

Where he is on stronger ground is the basic calculus of peace. He is right that Ukraine needs to be strong enough to defend itself for any peace to work. He is right that a settlement will have to acknowledge territorial realities, at least as a temporary condition. The idea of using seized Russian assets to buy weapons from US companies has potential, but discounts the removal of those assets as a lever for coming to a settlement.

Fridman is a good interviewer generally, but also reveals himself to be somewhat outside his expertise by the lack of detailed follow-up questions. He's done his homework, and he has clear ideas, but he's not a specialist, and as such overlooks some of the basic issues that will need to be addressed. He also does not discuss historical cases that have relevance here in helping to understand the opportunities and limitations for a peace settlement.

Overall, it's a very political interview. Zelensky takes positions that are domestically focused but acceptable to Ukraine's supporters. Unfortunately, they are also often impractical when it comes to arriving at a settlement with Russia, and that's the primary concern at the moment. My reading is that Zelensky is hoping against hope that his stated positions can carry more weight than they actually have behind them, taking into account the upcoming shift in US leadership and the relative weakness of Europe (which everyone but the Europeans seems well aware of). The question he will have to face is how much ground he can give in negotiations and still maintain domestic support; taking fairly hard-line stands makes this difficult, and I expect the biggest domestic pressure he will face is from those who do not want to have any meaningful dialogue with Russia, which unfortunately means that the fighting is likely to carry on. If Ukraine is seen as the major roadblock on the way to peace (broadly defined), Zelensky will be in a very tricky situation, caught between his domestic pressures and his external sources of support.

The idea of Zelensky being boxed in by the hard liners seems reminiscent of Putin's situation.

In reply to Floating Doc (Forum Supporter) :

It is, to an extent. The difference is that Putin's hardliners want to keep fighting, and Zelensky's hardliners want to stop fighting so they can prosecute half of Russia for war crimes.

In reply to 02Pilot :

Yeah, I am interested in his Putin interview, but I am not expecting a lot of push back, which is desperately needed with Putin. I can also fully understand why someone would not want to get confrontational with Putin, in Russia!  I don't really expect a lot of useful info out of it.  Same same I suspect.

A bunch more sanctions on Russian energy sector, not sure what affect this will have:

Sweeping Sanctions on Russia’s Energy Sector

The United States is imposing sanctions today on more than 200 entities and individuals involved in Russia’s energy sector and identifying more than 180 vessels as blocked property. This wide-ranging, robust action will further constrain revenues from Russia’ energy resources and degrades Putin’s ability to fund his illegal war against Ukraine....

https://www.state.gov/office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/sweeping-sanctions-on-russias-energy-sector

Ukraine has reportedly been attacking Crimea (including taking out air defense systems) with drone boats, loaded with drones, that launch the drones near the coast.  So maybe the first drone aircraft (dronecraft?) carrier?

Some other highlights that talk of the current weak point of the Russian military and a seemingly STILL complete lack of interest in negotiations by Russia:

• Ukraine's Western partners reiterated their support for Ukraine and their commitment to the development of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base in Germany on January 9.
• Ukraine's Western partners announced additional military aid packages at Ramstein Air Base on January 9.
• Russian elites and high-ranking security officials are reportedly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin's efforts to wage a full-scale war in Ukraine with half measures and are increasingly concerned with Putin's timeline to end the war.
• High-ranking Russian security officials appear to be assessing that Russia needs to intensify its war in Ukraine rather than seek an exit via negotiations.
• Russian elites' reported diagnosis of the main problem with Russia's conduct of the war is inaccurate, as Russia's failure to restore maneuver to the battlefield — not a shortage of manpower — is the main factor causing Russia's relatively slow rate of advance.
• Meduza's report indicates that Russia's security elite — like Putin himself — is uninterested in a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the war in the near future.
• A Russian opposition investigative outlet reported that Russian authorities have turned a pretrial detention center (SIZO) in Taganrog, Voronezh Oblast into a torture center for Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and imprisoned Ukrainian civilians.
• The UN condemned the recent surge in Russian executions of Ukrainian POWs.
• The Armenian government approved a draft law on January 9, beginning Armenia's accession process into the EU.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk and in Kursk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Sudzha.
• Russian officials continue to indicate that the Kremlin intends to further militarize the Russian government and Russian society in the long term.

Here is another installment of that same series that does a pretty good job of explaining things.  Information of course is still a bit sparse on this, but they bring up some things that were certainly not commonly know when it happened.  Of particular interest were the special forced groups that were set out to ambush the reinforcements, and the use of drones to kill the Russian surveillance drones (and helicopters!). 

It brings up the concept of the necessity of air superiority in a combined arms attack.  But how does Ukraine do that, with almost no air force? With drones apparently!  Yes, Ukraine affectively gained air superiority over the battlefield with only drones!  Another first I suspect, and something many militaries (especially the US) are looking at very carefully!

aircooled said:

Ukraine has reportedly been attacking Crimea (including taking out air defense systems) with drone boats, loaded with drones, that launch the drones near the coast.  So maybe the first drone aircraft (dronecraft?) carrier?

 

I wonder what the dynamics are involving Turkiye (customer at work, got to spell it right, though I won't attempt the punctuation) are for Armenian accession to the EU

Stuff is on fire in russia:

https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.com/post/3lfphn5f5t227

Some perspective given in the comments section of that same post:

I'm also hearing more friendly fire incidents involving the north koreans.

The first was the Ukrainian drone pilots taking advantage of their inexperience and flying the drones between groups of NK men (resulting in the obvious, when the machine gun fire started up).

The latest was that a group of north koreans had opened fire on some russian positions.  Due to the language barier, communication wasn't possible, so the russians were forced to all back.

Also of note:  The opposition party in Slovakia is laying the groundwork for a "no confidence vote" regarding Fico.  His support of russia is cited as their reason.  (Unfortunately, I have zero idea what sort of support or momentum this would have, nor the political implications afterwards.)

https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/id4gro7/robert-fico-privital-vlastne-odvolavanie-a-budet-bordel-odkazal-opozicii/

Some updates.

- Ukraine has captured two North Koreans (who are not in Russia according to Russia).  According to interviews, they where under the impression they were there for training (which apparently they did get 2 weeks of!).  No idea they were going into combat, which sounds a bit familiar.

- The North Koreans apparently are having issues dealing with the drones.  As in, they tend to ignore them, which of course gets them blown up.

- A chinese ship apparently cut another cable between Sweden and Lithuania.  Suspicion is the captain was recruited by Russia.

- The new US admin is reportably ready to lift restrictions on long-range weapons for Ukraine to bring Putin to the negotiating table (I wonder if Putin has let them know he has nukes....).  The US is ready to impose more energy sanctions.

- The sanctions recently implimented apparently will shut down the Russian "Shadow Fleet" which they use to sell their oil on the open market.

Also this (apparently Russia is doing a similar thing in Ukraine):

AN ELDERLY MAN places a newspaper on an ATM terminal, douses it in spirit, and sets it alight while filming it all on his smartphone. The pensioner then repeats the trick twice more on December 21st—once unsuccessfully—before police nab him in Kolpino, near St Petersburg. Within days, Alexander Nikiforov is in court and charged with terrorism. But his case, echoing dozens of similar events targeting banks, post offices and police cars the same week, has raised more questions than it has answered. Mr Nikiforov claims he was acting not from conviction, but under the instructions of unidentified telephone scammers.

It is not the first time Russia has experienced arson attacks since beginning its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In the first year of the war, military recruitment offices and police departments were frequent targets. According to a forthcoming investigation by Mediazona, an independent Russian media outfit, there have been 280 arson attacks to date. But if the early wave of attacks were easily identifiable as anti-war or anti-mobilisation protests, that is no longer the case. The latest attacks, which peaked in the second half of December, appear more driven by manipulation and coercion. The perpetrators, often pensioners like Mr Nikiforov, claim to have been tricked into transferring large sums of cash, before somehow being persuaded they must burn ATMs to recover the money.

Russia is blaming Ukraine for the unusual campaign, citing both motive and means. On the latter point, Ukraine is somewhat of a world-leader in the phone scamming industry, with hundreds of murky call-centres operating from cities such as Kyiv and Dnipro. Since Russia began its original war on Ukraine in 2014, and Ukrainian law-enforcement agencies broke off all co-operation with Russia, Russian citizens have been prime targets of the criminal activity. Ukraine’s bilingualism and Russia’s high level of corruption, leading to masses of data being put up for sale on the dark net, have made it a lucrative business.

A Ukrainian law-enforcement source says such call-centres may have played a role in the latest wave of attacks. “They have skilled psychologists who can manipulate the vulnerable,” he says. “They are mainly motivated by cash, but they may occasionally serve the fatherland too.” Some sources within the intelligence agencies, however, claim more direct ownership of the operation. “Ukraine’s special services are at work,” one of them says. “It’s a routine operation.” The same source downplayed the suggestion that Russia’s arsonists did not know what they were doing. “When people are caught, they say anything, they drank something, were fed something, or were injected with something. But you can get a grandmother to throw a Molotov cocktail into a military office or wherever you want—if your price is right.”

The traffic is not just one-way. In the past year Russian intelligence has almost certainly used similar methods to conduct out an arms-length arson campaign against Ukrainian military vehicles. According to Ukraine’s police service, 341 vehicles were set alight in 2024 alone. The Ukrainian law-enforcement source says the perpetrators were mostly gullible, rather than ideologically driven. More often than not, they were motivated by promises of up to $1,000, cash that was rarely delivered. A total of 184 were charged.

Russian authorities have wasted little time in responding to the apparent Ukrainian operation. Little over a week after it in effect blocked YouTube, thus creating a firewall around any source that is not Russian propaganda, the Kremlin announced it would also ban internet telephony. But this possible recognition that some of Russia’s pensioner arsonists might have fallen victim to sophisticated manipulation is unlikely to help them in court. Only 0.26% of those charged are ever acquitted. Mr Nikiforov and the hundreds like him to be charged with terror crimes thus have little chance of avoiding a serious custodial sentence. “It’s impossible to defend people in Russia,” says Dmitry Zakhvatov, a lawyer, “whether they are scammed or not.”