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Dr. Hess
Dr. Hess UltimaDork
8/7/13 9:01 p.m.

Ran across this. An interesting read. Some OCR errors. Some things never change.

Notes on the Next War: A Serious Topical Letter

Not this August, nor this September; you have this year to do in what you like. Not next August, nor next September; that is still too soon; they are still too prosperous from the way things pick up when armament factories start at near capacity; they never fight as long as money can still be made without. So you can fish that summer and shoot that fall or do whatever you do, go home at nights, sleep with your wife, go to the ball game, make a bet, take a drink when you want to, or enjoy whatever liberties are left for anyone who has a dollar or a dime. But the year after that or the year after that they fight. Then what happens to you?

First you make a lot of money; maybe. There is a chance now that you make nothing; that it will be the government that makes it all. That is what, in the last analysis, taking the profits out of war means. If you are on relief you will be drafted into this great profitless work and you will be a slave from that day.
If there is a general European war we will be brought in if propaganda (think of how the radio will be used for this), greed, and the desire to increase the impaired health of the state can swing us in. Every move that is made now to deprive the people of their decision on all matters through their elected representatives and to delegate those powers to the executive brings us that much nearer war.
It removes the only possible check. No one man nor group of men incapable of fighting or exempt from fighting should in any way be given the power, no matter how gradually it is given them, to put this country or any country into war.

The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency; the second is war. Both bring a temporary prosperity; both bring a permanent ruin. But both are the refuge of political and economic opportunists.

No European country is our friend nor has been since the last war and no country but one's own is worth fighting for. Never again should this country be put into a European war through mistaken idealism, through propaganda, through the desire to back our creditors, or through the wish of anyone through war, notoriously the health of the state, to make a going concern out of a mismanaged one.

Now let us examine the present set-up and see what chance there is of avoiding war.

No nations, any more, pay their debts. There is no longer even a pretence of honesty between nations or of the nation toward the individual. Finland pays us still; but she is a new country and will learn better. We were a new country once and we learned better. Now when a country does not pay its debts you cannot take its word on anything. So we may discard any treaties or declarations of intentions by any countries which do not coincide completely and entirely with the immediate and most cynical national aims of those countries.

A few years ago, in the late summer, Italy and France mobilised along their border to fight over Italy's desire for colonial expansion in North Africa. All references to this mobilisation were censored out of cables and radiograms. Correspondents who mentioned it in mailed stories were threatened with expulsion. That difference has now been settled by Mussolini's shift of ambition to East Africa where he has obviously made a deal with the French to abandon his North African plans in return for France allowing him to make war on a free sovereign state under the protection of membership in the League of Nations.
Italy is a country of patriots and whenever things are going badly at home, business bad, oppression and taxation too great, Mussolini has only to rattle the sabre against a foreign country to make his patriots forget their dissatisfaction at home in their flaming zeal to be at the throats of the enemy. By the same system, early in his rule, when his personal popularity waned and the opposition was strengthened, an attempted assassination of the Duce would be arranged which would put the populace in such a frenzy of hysterical love for their nearly lost leader that they would stand for anything and patriotically vote the utmost repressive measures against the opposition.

Mussolini plays on their admirable patriotic hysteria as a violinist on his instrument but when France and Jugo-Slavia were the possible enemy he could never really give them the full Paganini because he did not want war with those countries; only the threat of war. He still remembers Caporetto, where Italy lost 320,000 men in killed, wounded and missing, of which amount 265,000 were missing, although he has trained a generation of young Italians who believe Italy to be an invincible military power.

Now he is setting out to make war on a feudal country, whose soldiers fight barefooted and with the formations of the desert and the middle ages; he plans to use planes against a people who have none and machine guns, flame projectors, gas, and modern artillery against bows and arrows, spears, and native cavalry armed with carbines. Certainly the stage is as nearly set as it ever can be for an Italian victory and such a victory as will keep Italians' minds off things at home for a long time. The only flaw is that Abyssinia has a small nucleus of trained, well armed troops.

France is glad to see him fight. In the first place anyone who fights may be beaten; Italy's Black Caporetto, her second greatest military debacle, was administered by these same Ethiopians at Adowa when fourteen thousand Italian troops were killed or driven from the field by a force which Mussolini now describes as ioo,ooo Ethiopians. Certainly it is unfair to ask fourteen thousand troops to fight one hundred thousand but the essence of war is not to confront your force of fourteen thousand with a hundred thousand of anything. Actually the Italians lost more than 4500 white and 2000 native troops, killed and wounded. Sixteen hundred Italians were taken prisoners. The Abyssinians admitted losing 3000 men.
The French remember Adowa and less possibly though more recently, Baer and Braddock (who knows but what Owney Madden may have bought a piece of the Ethiopians?), and they know that anybody who fights may be beaten. Dysentery, fever, the sun, bad transport, many things can defeat an army. There are also a number of tropical diseases which can only become epidemic when given the opportunity afforded by an invading army of men unused to the climate and possessing no immunity against them. Anyone who fights near the equator can be beaten by the mere difficulty of keeping an army in the field.

Then France feels that if Italy wins or loses, the war will cost her so much that she will be in no position to make trouble in Europe. Italy has never been a serious problem unless she has allies, because she has no coal and no iron. No nation can make war without coal and iron. Lately Italy has tried to overcome this by building up an enormous air-force and it is her air-force that makes her the threat she is in Europe today.

England is glad to see Italy fight Ethiopia. First she may be whipped which, they figure, will teach her a lesson and lengthen the peace of Europe. Secondly if she wins that removes the annoyance of Abyssinian raids along the northern frontier province of Kenya and gives someone else the responsibility of suppressing the perennial Abyssinian slave trade across to Arabia. Next England must undoubtedly have an arrangement with the possible victor about the water project in north-eastern Ethiopia which she has long coveted for the watering of the Sudan. It is only logical that Anthony Eden should have arranged about that when he was in Rome recently. Lastly she knows that anything Italy finds and brings out of Ethiopia must come through the Suez Canal or, taking the long way around, the straits of Gibraltar, while if Japan had been permitted to penetrate into Ethiopia and thus gain a foothold in Africa what she took would go direct to Japan and in time of necessity there would be no control over it.

Germany is glad to have Mussolini try to gobble Ethiopia. Any change in the African status quo provides an opening for her soonto-be-made demands for return of her African colonial possessions. This return, if made, will probably delay war for a long time. Germany, under Hitler, wants war, a war of revenge, wants it fervently, patriotically and almost religiously. France hopes that it will come before Germany is too strong. But the people of France do not want war.

There is the great danger and the great difference. France is a country and Great Britain is several countries but Italy is a man, Mussolini, and Germany is a man, Hitler. A man has ambitions, a man rules until he gets into economic trouble; he tries to get out of this trouble by war. A country never wants war until a man through the power of propaganda convinces it. Propaganda is stronger now than it has ever been before. Its agencies have been mechanised, multiplied and controlled until in a state ruled by any one man truth can never be presented.

War is no longer made by simply analysed economic forces if it ever was. War is made or planned now by individual men, demagogues and dictators who play on the patriotism of their people to mislead them into a belief in the great fallacy of war when all their vaunted reforms have failed to satisfy the people they misrule. And we in America should see that no man is ever given, no matter how gradually or how noble and excellent the man, the power to put this country into a war which is now being prepared and brought closer -ach day with all the premeditation of a long planned murder. For when you give power to an executive you do not know who will be filling that position when the time of crisis comes.

They wrote in the old days that it is sweet and fitting to die for one's country. But in modern war there is nothing sweet nor fitting n your dying. You will die like a dog for no good reason. Hit in the head you will die quickly and cleanly even sweetly and fittingly except for the white blinding flash that never stops, unless perhaps it s only the frontal bone or your optic nerve that is smashed, or your aw carried away, or your nose and cheek bones gone so you can still think but you have no face to talk with. But if you are not hit in the head you will be hit in the chest, and choke in it, or in the lower belly, and feel it all slip and slide loosely as you open, to spill out when you try to get up, it's not supposed to be so painful but they always scream with it, it's the idea I suppose, or have the flash, the Jamming clang of high explosive on a hard road and find your legs ue gone above the knee, or maybe just below the knee, or maybe just a foot gone and watch the white bone sticking through your puttee, or watch them take a boot off with your foot a mush inside it, or feel an arm flop and learn how a bone feels grating, or you will burn, choke and vomit, or be blown to hell a dozen ways, without sweetness or fittingness; but none of this means anything. No catalogue of horrors ever kept men from war. Before the war you always think that it's not you that dies. But you .will die, brother, if you go to it long enough.

The only way to combat the murder that is war is to show the dirty combinations that make it and the criminals and swine that hope for it and the idiotic way they run it when they get it so that an honest man will distrust it as he would a racket and refuse to be enslaved into it.

If war was fought by those who wanted to fight it and knew what they were doing and liked it, or even understood it, then it would be defensible. But those who want to go to the war, the élite, are killed off in the first months and the rest of the war is fought by men who are enslaved into the bearing of arms and, are taught to be more afraid of sure death from their officers if they run than possible death if they stay in the line or attack. Eventually their steadily increasing terror overcomes them, given the proper amount of bombardment and a given intensity of fire, and they all run and, if they get far enough out of hand, for that army it is over. Was there any allied army which did not, sooner or later, run during the last war? There is not room here to list them.

No one wins a modern war because it is fought to such a point that everyone must lose. The troops that are fighting at the end are incapable of winning. It is only a question of which government rots the first or which side can get in a new ally with fresh troops. Sometimes the allies are useful. Sometimes they are Rumania.

In a modern war there is no Victory. The allies won the war but the regiments that marched in triumph were not the men who fought the war. The men who fought the war were dead. More than seven million of them were dead and it is the murder of over seven million more that an ex-corporal in the German army and an exaviator and former morphine addict drunk with personal and military ambition and fogged in a blood-stained murk of misty patriotism look forward hysterically to today. Hitler wants war in Europe as soon as he can get it. He is an ex-corporal and he will not have to fight in this one; only to make the speeches. He himself has nothing to lose by making war and everything to gain.

Mussolini is an ex-corporal, too, but he is also an ex-anarchist, a great opportunist, and a realist. He wants no war in Europe. He will bluff in Europe but he never means to fight there. He can still remember what the war was like himself and how he left it after being wounded in an accident with an Italian trench mortar and went back to newspaper work. He does not want to fight in Europe because he knows that anyone who fights may lose, unless of course one can arrange to fight Rumania, and the first dictator who provokes a war and loses it puts a stop to dictators, and their sons, for a long time.

Because the development of his regime calls for a war he chooses Africa as the place to fight and the only surviving free African state as his opponent. The Abyssinians unfortunately are Christians so it cannot be a Holy war. But while he is making Ethiopia Fit for Fiats he can, of course, suppress slavery on paper, and doubtless in the Italian War College, it looks like a foolproof, quick and ideal campaign. But it may be that a regime and a whole system of government a-ill fall because of this foolproof war in less than three years.
A German colonel named Von Lettow-Vorbeck with an original force of 5000 troops, only two hundred and fifty of whom were whites, fought 190,000 allied troops for a period of over four years in Tanganyika and Portuguese Africa and caused the expenditure of 72,000,000 pounds sterling. At the end of the war he was still at large carrying on guerrilla warfare.

If the Abyssinians choose to fight on in guerrilla warfare rather than make peace Italy may find that Ethiopia will be an unhealing wound in her side that will drain away her money, her youth and her food supplies and return men broken in health and disgusted with suffering and the government that sent them to suffer with promises of glory. It is the disillusioned soldiers who overthrow a regime.

It may be that this war in Africa will prolong the temporary peace in Europe. In the meantime something may happen to Hitler. I of the hell broth that is brewing in Europe we have no need to dru Europe has always fought, the intervals of peace are only Armistice. We were fools to be sucked in once on a European war and we should never be sucked in again.

Ernest Hemingway
Notes on the Next War: A Serious Topical Letter
Esquire: September 1935

Giant Purple Snorklewacker
Giant Purple Snorklewacker MegaDork
8/7/13 10:19 p.m.

The more things change...

yamaha
yamaha PowerDork
8/7/13 10:28 p.m.
Giant Purple Snorklewacker wrote: The more things change...

The more they stay the same. I just hope the next one is after my lifetime.

pilotbraden
pilotbraden SuperDork
8/8/13 7:44 a.m.

A very perceptive piece of writing.

02Pilot
02Pilot HalfDork
8/8/13 8:17 a.m.

Perceptive as regards domestic policy concerns and the coming of the European War, perhaps, but not unique among contemporaries; there were many observers who foresaw war as early as 1935, and many who complained bitterly about the New Deal.

Where it fails is in the fact that Hemingway was describing the way in which the last war was fought - a grinding battle of attrition on virtually every front that mattered, leading to exhaustion rather than victory - as being predictive of the methodology and outcome of the next war, which it most certainly was not. The Second World War produced clear victors, the United States first among them. Hemingway was also not the only commentator to get this wrong, either.

Dr. Hess
Dr. Hess UltimaDork
8/8/13 8:59 a.m.

WWII was still a war of attrition. Germany (and Japan, for that matter) had nothing left to fight with.

I found his political observations to be quite insightful. For example:

The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency; the second is war. Both bring a temporary prosperity; both bring a permanent ruin. But both are the refuge of political and economic opportunists.

The Ethiopian angle was an interesting observation. I don't think we really pay too much attention to Italy's adventure into Ethiopia from a historical perspective today. The Ethiopians still do. I remember reading a National Geographic article on Ethiopia where the writer was going down a river about 10 years ago. He stopped and talked with locals who told him they saw him from the cliff and were going to shoot him because he looked Italian, but he waved at someone, so they figured he was OK. He did lots of waving the rest of the trip.

Xceler8x
Xceler8x UltraDork
8/8/13 9:14 a.m.
Dr. Hess wrote: WWII was still a war of attrition. Germany (and Japan, for that matter) had nothing left to fight with. I found his political observations to be quite insightful. For example:
The first panacea for a mismanaged nation is inflation of the currency; the second is war. Both bring a temporary prosperity; both bring a permanent ruin. But both are the refuge of political and economic opportunists.
The Ethiopian angle was an interesting observation. I don't think we really pay too much attention to Italy's adventure into Ethiopia from a historical perspective today. The Ethiopians still do. I remember reading a National Geographic article on Ethiopia where the writer was going down a river about 10 years ago. He stopped and talked with locals who told him they saw him from the cliff and were going to shoot him because he looked Italian, but he waved at someone, so they figured he was OK. He did lots of waving the rest of the trip.

That political observation is very interesting.

Crazy to think too that Germany was still not a truly mechanized army back then. The soldiers literally walked everywhere.

Japan? Still had wooden houses. We destroyed 50% of Tokyo's industry via firebombing. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Tokyo#Results

e_pie
e_pie HalfDork
8/8/13 9:18 a.m.

All of our recent wars have done nothing but reenforce this:

No one wins a modern war because it is fought to such a point that everyone must lose. The troops that are fighting at the end are incapable of winning. It is only a question of which government rots the first or which side can get in a new ally with fresh troops. Sometimes the allies are useful. Sometimes they are Romania.

War on Drugs, yeah that's going well

War on Terror, just as bad

Korea and Vietnam, same thing

MadScientistMatt
MadScientistMatt UltraDork
8/8/13 9:36 a.m.
Dr. Hess wrote: WWII was still a war of attrition. Germany (and Japan, for that matter) had nothing left to fight with.

On the other hand, it wasn't like World War I's case of continuously throwing men at a front that hardly ever moved for years, either. There was a bit more back and forth to it.

yamaha
yamaha PowerDork
8/8/13 10:21 a.m.
Dr. Hess wrote: WWII was still a war of attrition. Germany (and Japan, for that matter) had nothing left to fight with.

Japan would have fought us with the citizen population armed with pointed sticks......they gave in after we crossed over into the next level of warfare. I don't think they could comprehend what was happening, 1 plane + 1 bomb = 1 city destroyed.

Germany however, they didn't have anything left.

02Pilot
02Pilot HalfDork
8/8/13 10:23 a.m.

Ethiopia is a historical footnote now, and rightly so, but in late 1935 it was headlines. Consider for example the US involvement in Somalia in 1992-4 - it made lots of news at the time, and there have been indications of al-Qaeda links to anti-US forces there, but how much attention will it get when people talk about the conflicts sparked by the September 11th attacks, or even the conflicts of the immediate post-Cold War period in general, 70 years after the fact?

It is also important to consider that the usages of certain key words have changed in the intervening years. "War" in 1935 meant international or intranational conflict on a broad scale, carried out by organized forces; the "War on Drugs" or even the "War on Terror" in the modern usage would not have fallen under the narrower earlier usage. Similarly, Hemingway's usage of "lose" came into being after the First World War to imply perceived excesses in human and material costs of prolonged warfare, rather than the more precise usage linking it to military and political defeat. While the post-WWI usage is still common, it conflates two rather different, though sometimes (especially in democracies) related issues.

Attrition can have different implications depending on the scale. The Second World War was one of strategic attrition - the means to fight no longer existed on a national industrial and economic scale - while in the Great War the effects of attrition were more prominently displayed at the operational level. Also worth noting is that while attrition was a byproduct of failed operational methods in the First World War, it was in fact achieved by purposeful strategic design in the Second.

Where Hemingway does strike a chord is in his representation of the international political system. His realist approach, assuming a competitive and dynamic system of nation-states, is something that sees very little discussion in the press (though it is still a matter of considerable academic debate). If one replaces the Great Powers of 1935 with those of today, and applies similar logic to the current international situation, there may in fact be some notable similarities.

Ian F
Ian F PowerDork
8/8/13 10:33 a.m.
Xceler8x wrote: Crazy to think too that Germany was still not a truly mechanized army back then. The soldiers literally walked everywhere.

A large percentage of the German army was moved via horses. One of my father's friends wrote a book about it:

http://www.amazon.com/Mechanized-Juggernaut-Military-Anachronism-Stackpole/dp/0811735036

I agree that WWI and WWII were won through attrition moreso that through outright victories in battle. In many ways, our own Civil War was the same and considered by many to be the first "modern war."

Dr. Hess
Dr. Hess UltimaDork
8/8/13 10:43 a.m.

I agree with your observations, O2.

yamaha, there is considerable debate today as to what Japan would have done. They were, in fact, basically wiped out from an attrition standpoint already. They were not capable of making the things necessary to continue the war, while the US was (basically the only power at the time that was.) They might have gone the pointy stick route or they might have just surrendered. Or, they might have deployed their nuclear bomb on us first. Bet you didn't know they had one, huh? Torched off the test bomb on an island off what is today North Korea. The Koreans speak of an extra sunrise one day. Their plan was to put one on a sub, sail it into San Francisco harbor and set it off on a super Kamikaze run. History glosses that one over, and of course, the US probably didn't know the Japanese were planning on nuking SF at the time. The Russians were also moving in and were going to try to claim half of Japan instead of just the top two islands that they wound up with. There's debate as to how much that influenced the decision to nuke them. That is, nuke Japan now, take out a couple cities and end it so the Russians don't drag the whole thing out further, and the Japanese don't try a pointy stick defense thing. At that time, no one really knew what the long term effects of nuking a city would be. And, as you look at it, those two cities are basically fine today, unlike Fukushima with is not fine and likely will never be again.

Dr. Hess
Dr. Hess UltimaDork
8/8/13 10:49 a.m.

Also, on the attrition thing: Victory ships and Liberty ships. We could literally churn them out faster than the Germans could sink them. A shipyard once did a publicity stunt. They set up their supply chain and start to finish, made a complete Liberty ship including the launch in 4 days 15.5 hours after the keel was laid. They said that when Hitler heard of it, he remarked "We've lost the war."

That's what Americans can do with leadership and a work together attitude. Is it any wonder that today we have no leadership and a divide us into 2 camps attitude?

AngryCorvair
AngryCorvair PowerDork
8/8/13 11:05 a.m.
Basil Exposition
Basil Exposition HalfDork
8/8/13 11:20 a.m.

Last I read about it, the evidence was pretty thin that Japan actually tested a bomb, though the iron curtain quickly fell over that area and perhaps we'll never know for sure. However, there is no doubt both Japan and Germany were working feverishly on atomic weapons and it was just a matter of time, and perhaps not much time, before they developed and deployed them. The handwringing over the US use of the bomb on Japan that usually occurs on its anniversary is revisionist in the worst way and borderline idiotic, in my view. It was the thing that had to be done at the time in the context of the time.

All wars are wars of attrition to some degree. That's what the weapons are for. I think the real distinction between WWI and WWII is that WWI was fought to a negotiated victory; while the Allies' unwavering aim in WWII was unconditional surrender, largely as a result of the flawed end of WWI that helped to foment WWII.

Interesting how Hemingway emphasizes the dangers of the cult of personalities around Hitler and Mussolini, while showing a lot of insight into the geopolitics of the time with individual countries angling for what benefited them in the short term while ignoring the consequences in the long term. Isn't it ever so?

aircooled
aircooled PowerDork
8/8/13 11:25 a.m.
Dr. Hess wrote: Also, on the attrition thing:....

Another way to look at that is it was a war of industry. From a US / German perspective the US has a huge advantage in industrial might (German certainly was no slouch at the time). The Soviets has a similar (eventually), advantage. Almost any war will involve attrition and when they go on long enough the victor will either be the one with the most fortitude (take the losses) or the one with the most industry (to make up for the losses).

An interesting way to look at the approaches of the different millitaries involved is that German in general was obsessed with high quality precision weapons and tended toward large "ultimate" weapons. This resulted in impressive things such as the Tiger tank. But... when the Soviets can built 10 of the rather simple, low precision T-34's for the same effort, the Tiger is going to loose eventually.

Not sure about your references to a Japanese A-bomb. From what I have seen, they were well away from making any sort of functional bomb. The effort involved with creating the heavy water alone I think was pretty far beyond them at the time.

Also, consider the ridiculously huge amount of money, manpower and resources (which Japan was short on all of) that the US spend to make two bombs it seem VERY unlikely Japan could pull that out. Germany could not be much of a help either, their heavy water program was knocked out by the allies as soon as they learned about it.

yamaha
yamaha PowerDork
8/8/13 12:42 p.m.

In reply to aircooled:

The most I have ever seen about that was the fact that U-boats had been taking supplies, plans, and parts to the Japanese for the production of heavy water and their plans for atomic weapons. The rest could have happened, but its just uncertain.

I still believe the Japanese would have put up some type form of intense defense to the invasions of their home islands, and still believe that Hiroshima & Nagisaki saved more lives than they took. But had they decided to keep fighting, they still would have lost. At the cost of hundreds of thousands to perhaps a million lives total.

Our military brass didn't really want that, and thats kinda what led to the use of the atom bombs. It was a last ditch attempt to prevent a ground invasion.

z31maniac
z31maniac PowerDork
8/8/13 1:09 p.m.
Dr. Hess wrote: I agree with your observations, O2. yamaha, there is considerable debate today as to what Japan would have done. They were, in fact, basically wiped out from an attrition standpoint already. They were not capable of making the things necessary to continue the war, while the US was (basically the only power at the time that was.) They might have gone the pointy stick route or they might have just surrendered. Or, they might have deployed their nuclear bomb on us first. Bet you didn't know they had one, huh? Torched off the test bomb on an island off what is today North Korea. The Koreans speak of an extra sunrise one day. Their plan was to put one on a sub, sail it into San Francisco harbor and set it off on a super Kamikaze run. History glosses that one over, and of course, the US probably didn't know the Japanese were planning on nuking SF at the time. The Russians were also moving in and were going to try to claim half of Japan instead of just the top two islands that they wound up with. There's debate as to how much that influenced the decision to nuke them. That is, nuke Japan now, take out a couple cities and end it so the Russians don't drag the whole thing out further, and the Japanese don't try a pointy stick defense thing. At that time, no one really knew what the long term effects of nuking a city would be. And, as you look at it, those two cities are basically fine today, unlike Fukushima with is not fine and likely will never be again.

I recently read something that suggested the main reason Japan wouldn't surrender was the US insistence on a no compromise surrender.

The Japanese thought this meant the US would want to remove the Emperor (held as divine) from power, and they were unwilling to accept this.

Bobzilla
Bobzilla UberDork
8/8/13 1:31 p.m.

Paul's right about the Miltary brass dreading a japanese mainland invasion. After Iwo and he heavy casualties we suffered to take the island, the thought of trying to invade the japanese mainland had estimates of US casualties in the million range.

US firebombing of Japan killed more people than both nukes, but you never see the handwringing over that. It's odd.

z31maniac
z31maniac PowerDork
8/8/13 2:17 p.m.
Bobzilla wrote: Paul's right about the Miltary brass dreading a japanese mainland invasion. After Iwo and he heavy casualties we suffered to take the island, the thought of trying to invade the japanese mainland had estimates of US casualties in the million range. US firebombing of Japan killed more people than both nukes, but you never see the handwringing over that. It's odd.

The same article I read said that number was DRAMATICALLY overstated. Some estimates at the time put the number closer to 50,000. Not the oft mentioned hundreds of thousands at the time.

The "million" number you mentioned came from Bush Sr.

yamaha
yamaha PowerDork
8/8/13 3:30 p.m.

In reply to z31maniac:

The emporor part was never in the Potsdam Declaration. Only the military was supposed to stand down unconditionally.

Bobzilla
Bobzilla UberDork
8/8/13 3:38 p.m.
z31maniac wrote:
Bobzilla wrote: Paul's right about the Miltary brass dreading a japanese mainland invasion. After Iwo and he heavy casualties we suffered to take the island, the thought of trying to invade the japanese mainland had estimates of US casualties in the million range. US firebombing of Japan killed more people than both nukes, but you never see the handwringing over that. It's odd.
The same article I read said that number was DRAMATICALLY overstated. Some estimates at the time put the number closer to 50,000. Not the oft mentioned hundreds of thousands at the time. The "million" number you mentioned came from Bush Sr.

Considering we suffered 26,040 casualties on Iwo alone, 50k sounds like a pipe dream. Hell, we had 49k casualties on Okinawa. You really expect me to believe that assaulting mainland Japan would have only brought on another 1k casualties?

Umm... yeah. right.

yamaha
yamaha PowerDork
8/8/13 3:42 p.m.

In reply to Bobzilla:

And even though they were done for, they were still going to put almost everything left into the one last battle.

z31maniac
z31maniac PowerDork
8/8/13 3:42 p.m.
Bobzilla wrote:
z31maniac wrote:
Bobzilla wrote: Paul's right about the Miltary brass dreading a japanese mainland invasion. After Iwo and he heavy casualties we suffered to take the island, the thought of trying to invade the japanese mainland had estimates of US casualties in the million range. US firebombing of Japan killed more people than both nukes, but you never see the handwringing over that. It's odd.
The same article I read said that number was DRAMATICALLY overstated. Some estimates at the time put the number closer to 50,000. Not the oft mentioned hundreds of thousands at the time. The "million" number you mentioned came from Bush Sr.
Considering we suffered 26,040 casualties on Iwo alone, 50k sounds like a pipe dream. Hell, we had 49k casualties on Okinawa. You really expect me to believe that assaulting mainland Japan would have only brought on another 1k casualties? Umm... yeah. right.

I can assure you, I couldn't care less what your opinion is or what you believe, I was merely relating something from another article I read. Did I claim anywhere it was the be-all end-all of knowledge regarding the Pacific Theater? I prefer to read views from all different sides on a variety of subjects.

I'm trying to find the article I was reading, but I'm having a hard time finding it at the moment.

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